

IBON Primer on South-South Cooperation



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IBON PRIMER ON SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

IBON International



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Introduction

Development assistance and the approaches and the modalities in which it is provided to the Global South are always subject to constant flux. From its beginnings as an economic and infrastructure support for countries ravaged by World War to it being seen as an investment toward the global public good, its practice and methods have also readily adapted to the changes in history and the ways in which the concept of development is conceived.

The traditional North-South development aid framework was based mainly on industrialized nations providing aid to developing countries in order to help meet their development goals. The relations between donor and recipient were characterized as unequal and paternalistic. Moreover, traditional development aid was also used as tools to further geopolitical and economic interests of Northern nations. These and many other characteristics of traditional North-South aid led to the Global South's search for alternative development approaches.

South-South cooperation emerged in the 1950s in the context of the common struggle of former colonies for genuine independence and development. Twenty-nine countries from Asia and Africa met in the Bandung Conference in 1955 to promote economic and cultural cooperation in the Asian-African region "on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty." This was an important step as a pioneering South-South conference that paved the way for the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and the Group of 77 in 1964.

For example, as early as the mid-1950s China's development assistance started and it increased in the 1960s and 1970s. Its support focused on agriculture, technical assistance, and a few infrastructure projects such as the 1,200-mile Tanzania-Zambia Railroad – its largest aid project in history at US\$500 million – built between 1970 and 1975. While Chinese foreign assistance decreased in the 1980s, it picked up again in the 1990s.

Around this period of nascent cooperation, the United States was also boosting foreign aid within the framework of mutual security, channelling resources to foreign governments that it wanted to enlist in its global anti-communist crusade (such as South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Iran, Jordan and Pakistan), while the old colonial powers in Europe were reconfiguring their economic and political relations with their colonies in reaction to the success of national liberation movements and anti-colonial struggles in the latter. It is thus important to acknowledge that geopolitics, foreign policy and political economy

are key dimensions in understanding South-South cooperation in the post-Cold War context.

In the past few decades, there has been a notable rise of cooperation among Southern countries. They engage in active diplomatic dialogue, forums and knowledge-sharing hubs, regional or global economic or political formations, and development cooperation. These activities among the Global South are collectively referred to as South-South Cooperation (SSC). What is still lacking however is an international consensus on the working definition and parameters of what constitutes SSC. The difficulty comes in differentiating the concept from the myriad of cooperation activities in which participating Southern countries are engaged in such as trade, economic agreements, political coalitions, development cooperation, and foreign investments.

Despite this, there is overwhelming support for SSC activities from the international development community. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon credits SSC for offering “real, concrete solutions to common development challenges” (UN Secretary General 2013). The G20 Summit Document in 2010 lauds the scaling up and the mainstreaming of experience- and knowledge-sharing between developing countries for capacity-building (G20 2012). The potentials seen in addressing development challenges from Southern experience and know-how have convinced the international community that this is a development tool that needs to be utilized, supported, and developed further.

This Southern-led approach to development also points towards a possible novel shift in development paradigm. SSC presents positive changes in donor-recipient relations, the modalities and approaches in development, and the diversity of development actors. This presents an opportunity for the Global South to create alternative spaces to pursue their development path apart from the hegemonic notions of development prescribed by Western institutions such as that of the Bretton Woods.

As a development tool, there is a need to thoroughly study and review the global experiences of countries engaged in SSC. The rise of the BRICS group has brought with it institutions and alliances that could potentially change the future of the development landscape but there is much debate as to whether this will truly bring positive developments for the Global South. Rather, this might merely be a shift of global power from the Western countries to the emerging economies. Another area for study is the concerns and criticisms of South-South development cooperation (SSDC) on its adherence to the principles of development effectiveness and its over-all added value to the current development landscape. This primer will serve as an overview and initial exploration into the complexity of SSC, the particularity of its development cooperation, the opportunities it brings and the challenges that it faces.

CHAPTER I

Defining South-South Cooperation

I. How did SSC begin?

The beginning of cooperation among developing countries all over the world sprung as a collective reaction to the political and economic changes going on in the international arena. The idea of solidarity grew from the shared historical experiences of countries of the Global South which had collectively gone through centuries of colonialism and the World Wars. Many of these countries have been involved in decades-long struggle against the colonial masters for their national independence. Some were pulled into the subsequent chaos of the World Wars which were essentially battles of the global powers for spheres of influence. In the early half of the 20th century, there was palpable international discontent not only due to the history of oppression of the Global South but also because of the continuing unequal relationship of the Northern countries in its economic and political dealings with their Southern counterparts.

Political cooperation

The Bandung Conference, which was convened in April of 1955 in Indonesia, was the first of its kind in the history of international relations. This was set in the backdrop of an increasing international conflict between the two major powers, the United States and Soviet Union. The Cold War was set to divide the world into two ideological and political blocs and this became a major concern for newly-decolonized countries. These Third World countries were united in their interest to maintain their independence from the competing spheres of global power. They also expressed their intent to engage in mutual cooperation to maintain peace and prevent what was an impending war.

The Conference was organized by Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan and had the participation of 29 newly-independent countries of Africa and Asia. During the conference, world leaders expressed their support for the anti-colonialist struggles of other countries. They were also aware and wary of the aid and military alliances offered by the US government through John Foster Dulles's foreign policy which was expressly aimed to counter communism (Young 2005, 13).

The Ten Bandung Principles were based on *inter alia* the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, recognition of equality of all nations, abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, and the promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.

Six years after the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement was created by five leaders of the Third World nations namely, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. The Havana Declaration of 1979 states the goal of the movement which was to ensure “the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries” in their “struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics (Castro).”

The First Summit in Belgrade in 1961 was initially attended by 25 countries and membership later on grew throughout the decades. The movement was not only an expression of solidarity among Third World nations but also became the forefront of decolonization and anti-apartheid struggle and the basis for mutual cooperation among the affiliated countries. Among the purposes adopted later in the 14th Summit in Havana is the promotion of South-South Cooperation to ensure human development and enhance international solidarity.

Economic and technical cooperation

The origins of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) trace the next step towards a greater acceptance of the need for South-South coalitions. UNCTAD was conceived through a non-UN meeting of Asian, African, and Latin American countries for the Conference on Problems of the Developing Countries which was held in Cairo in 1962. The Cairo Declaration called for the holding of a conference in the UN framework on relevant issues on trade and economy between developing and developed countries.

UNCTAD was first convened in the context of an increasing disillusionment with the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT, signed in 1948, was an interim agreement which promoted international cooperation on international trade and established ground rules on tariff regulation. However, it was profoundly lacking in including provisions to ensure developing countries' capacity to fairly participate in the trade negotiations. GATT negotiations worked with the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle which assured equal trade advantages with the partner country. This severely curtailed the developing countries' negotiating power given that they were not economically at par with OECD countries.

Developing countries were also left marginalized within the processes of the WB and IMF since voting power is unbalanced and clearly favouring developed countries with the greatest shares in investment. These institutions also primarily advocated neoliberal policies in trade and were adverse to putting in place preferential trading systems and allowing protectionist policies for developing countries. GATT negotiations were also limited for nations espousing neoliberal economic development and excluded all socialist countries.

UNCTAD which became an organ of the UN General Assembly was convened on an ambitious goal of advocating for an alternative international trade system that would allow developing countries to compete in a level playing field. It ran contrary to the prevailing notions of free trade and espoused preferential treatment for developing countries to effectively fill in the global trade gap. It holds periodic sessions from which to assess, discuss, and negotiate on trade and development issues. UNCTAD also finances technical cooperation and assistance among member countries.

The Group of 77 (G77) was born out of the developing countries' collective search for an alternative. It was established in 1964 in an UNCTAD Conference in Geneva with the initial membership of 77 developing nations and has grown to 132 member countries at present. It was seen as the beginning of the inclusion of social development in affecting economic growth in developing countries. The Joint Declaration considered the formation of the coalition as "an initial step towards an international endorsement of a new trade policy for development" (G77 1964). It cited the necessity to adopt new approaches and perspectives in the international economic field to address the trade gap and the prevalence of poverty in their societies.

The purpose of the creation of the G77 was to increase the bargaining power of developing countries in the United Nations and to promote the collective economic interests of those involved in the loose coalition. It provided an arena for developing countries to discuss proposals and programs in the UN and enhance the cooperation initiatives among nations in the developing world.

The adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) in 1978 further entrenched the validity and importance of South-South Cooperation. It spurred the international recognition of technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) and created practical guidelines for carrying out TCDC. Adopted by 138 countries, this intended to provide a detailed plan to put into practice this new approach to development assistance which advocated complementing North-South development aid with cooperation projects and programs among developing countries (UNDP 1978).

The realities of economic and political inequalities between the Northern and Southern countries were evidently seen in the major international institutions, the

global economic system, and development aid. There was therefore a growing realization that the expansion of international cooperation and relations needed the equal participation of developing countries and fair distribution of benefits. TCDC was seen as a means to foment national and collective self-reliance and provide developing countries the capacity to solve their development problems. It advocates technical exchanges of knowledge and successful policies and experiences in addressing social and development problems for the participating countries' mutual benefit. BAPA sought to facilitate this modality by presenting 38 practical recommendations and urging international organizations and developed countries to actively support TCDC by means of financing or other kinds of assistance.

Global trend of SSC

The global expansion of SSC can be clearly seen through the proliferation of regional cooperation formations throughout the latter half of the 20th century. Regionalism itself has evolved throughout history with a distinction noted by academics on the kind of regionalism currently being adopted globally. Classical regionalism which was the mainstay of the 1950s and 1960s was based on the context of the global division of the cold war logic which was imposed by competing superpowers. It was primarily uni-dimensional focused on military, political, or economic cooperation (Hettne and Soderbaum 2006, 182).

The 1980s brought a new wave of regional cooperation which was based more on multi-dimensional sectors of interests such as trade, security, culture, economics, science and technology, development assistance, etc. It was mainly driven by an internal necessity within the regions themselves to promote and work on those shared interests. An example of such regionalism is the European Union which encompasses 28 countries and which hosts various regional independent institutions such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Parliament, to name a few. It is considered to be the most advanced model of regional integration in the Global North.

Southern countries have actively striven to found institutions of cooperation throughout the past few decades. The first of these institutions was the Arab League which was created in 1945 by six Arab nations namely Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. It was however in the 1960s when the boom of regional cooperation truly began with the establishment in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity, later renamed the African Union. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created three years later through the initial membership of five founding countries.

This spurred on other regional formations in Latin America and the Caribbean among which are the Andean Community, Caribbean Community (CARICOM),

the Common Market of South Cone (Mercosur), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). In Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) founded in 1975 set the milestone for sub-regional cooperation in the continent. This was later followed almost two decades later by the formation of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Currently, there is a multiplicity of regional institutions and cooperation agreements within Southern countries which are based on cooperating on a number of common interests which are often carried out through independent regional thematic institutions.

Cooperation within the Global South on specifically providing development assistance and technical cooperation is also shown through the proliferation of regional development institutions around the globe. A prime example of this in Africa is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which binds together 15 states in an aim to bring about regional integration in terms of economy, politics, and security. It also includes a development cooperation component which is meant to effectively coordinate and facilitate the mobilization of resources and promote information-sharing and strategic policy dialogues among member countries. It expressly defines poverty reduction and socio-economic development as among its key objectives.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also provides a significant amount of investment in development projects and programs around the region. It plays an important role in ensuring economic stability for the Gulf region as can be seen through its US\$ 20-billion aid deal for troubled Oman and Bahrain in 2011 (Murphy 2011). In fact, many of the regional institutions such as ASEAN, ALBA, and ECOWAS and others mentioned previously have a development cooperation component in operation.

Rise of BRICS

The rise of the BRICS economies on the other hand poses a new way to look at SSC and a challenge to US and European-led dominance. The “BRIC” as a term was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs’ paper discussing the impending shift of economic power from the developed countries to some potential countries in the developing world, specifically Brazil, Russia, India, and China. It predicted these four economies collectively overtaking the output of the G7 nations by 2032 (Beattie 2010). South Africa was later added into this group in 2010 recognizing its economic advancement and influential position in the African region.

These five emerging economies currently represent more than a quarter of the world’s GDP and over 40% of the global population (BRICS 2013a, 3). They also host approximately 40% of the global labor force. OECD statistics puts the combined development assistance flows of the BRICS to other developing countries at US\$

3.77 billion in 2011, excluding Brazil which did not publish data on the total spent on development assistance in 2010 and 2011. Although developed countries still continue to be the major source of ODA, the emerging countries have been steadily increasing their development finance.

Estimate of gross concessional flows for development co-operation ("ODA-like" flows) from the BRICS						
Current USD Millions						
Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Source
ODA as reported to the DAC						
Russia ¹				472.3	479.0	Reporting by Russia to the DAC
Estimates on ODA-like flows as published in national publications						
Brazil ²	291.9	336.8	362.2	n.a.	n.a.	Office of the Presidency, Brazil.
China	1,466.9	1,807.6	1,947.7	2,010.6	2,468.1	Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance, China Annual Reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India.
India ³	392.6	609.5	488.0	639.1	730.7	Estimates of Public Expenditures 2010-2012, National Treasury, South Africa.
South Africa ³	82.3	86.0	82.5	87.7	95.1	

1) The Russian Federation began reporting its ODA figures to the DAC in 2011 on 2010 flows (see Table 33a).

2) Brazil has not published complete figures on its development cooperation in 2010 and 2011.

3) Figures for India and South Africa are based on their fiscal years. 2011 data corresponds to fiscal year 2011/2012.

(OECD 2012a)

Set in the backdrop of a protracted financial crisis playing out in the developed countries, there is growing recognition of the BRICS group's potential to influence global economy. The least developed countries and middle-income countries are currently relying on trade ties with the BRICS to counter the external shock to their economies (Morazan et al 2012, 7). Their continued stability despite the crisis and the growing economic cooperation among the BRICS is seen to be a prelude to the powerful role they will play in the future global economy.

Although the conception of BRICS did not predict the formation of a bloc among these emerging countries, there have been obvious efforts in recent years to turn this into reality. The IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) Dialogue Summit was created after the failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Conference in Cancun. Negotiations between the three emerging economies yielded the Brasilia Declaration that formalized the trilateral cooperation.

The coalition's main aim was to strengthen the three countries' position in the multilateral institutions of the WTO, IMF, and the UN. All of these countries, given their notably growing political and economic power, are pushing for substantial reforms of these institutions. India and Brazil particularly have the common interest of demanding a seat in the United Nations Security Council with the argument that this would lead to the much needed representation of the Latin American and South Asian region. IBSA also aimed to promote stronger economic and trade ties among the countries and embark on commercial and technological exchanges in information and communication technologies, transport, and energy (Fontaine 2007, 3).

The 1st BRICS Summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2008 where the state leaders discussed various global issues ranging from world economy, political issues, and food crisis. The group has since then held annual summits with the Durban Summit being the most recent. It was during this particular summit that the bloc reiterated their commitment to increasing development cooperation with the African region. It also affirmed their “engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular Emerging Market and Developing Countries” (BRICS 2013b).

The Durban Summit also heralded the five countries’ agreement to finance the BRICS Development Bank. The necessity for its establishment has been pointed out by some economists arguing that the developing world would need to raise infrastructure spending from US\$800 billion to US\$2 trillion annually to be able to sustain socio-economic development. The Bretton Woods institutions and other multilateral and regional banks do not have the sufficient resources to meet this funding gap (Bhattacharya et al 2013). BRICS leaders have agreed to pool together US\$100 billion of foreign reserves to implement the development bank initiative.

The initiative also reflects the BRICS’ disillusionment and mistrust in the IMF and the WB. This was clearly stated in the Fifth Summit Declaration which called for the reform of these institutions which at present do not represent the weight of the emerging economies in the decision-making process. It sought a change in the systems of governance, quota, and the leadership selection in these international financial institutions.

The development bank initiative and the annual summits are only two of the major efforts to engage in intra-BRICS cooperation. The group has successfully convened various meetings on common areas of interests as exemplified by the Agriculture Ministers’ Meetings in Moscow, the Trade Ministers’ Meetings in Sanya, and the Health Ministers’ Meetings in Beijing which were all held in 2011.

The BRICS countries themselves have contributed substantially to development assistance efforts with other non-BRICS countries. Brazil, for one, plays an important role in engaging in development cooperation with Southern countries and promoting regional integration in Latin America. China remains the top provider of South-South development cooperation.

II. What are the fundamental principles of SSC?

The increased participation of non-OECD development actors is one of the notable defining characteristics of today’s international development cooperation. With the reduction in traditional North-South transfers of development assistance due to the recent economic crisis, many developing countries have increased their

commitment to furthering development cooperation with the Global South. South-South Cooperation has been used generally to refer to any kind of cooperation arrangement or transfers of knowledge or finances between countries of the Global South.

There is yet no official definition of South-South Cooperation. This lack of clarity makes it difficult to gauge whether SSC is a tool for achieving development outcomes or the political and economic aims of the Southern countries involved. Given the multitude of cooperation arrangements among the nations of the Global South which range from knowledge-sharing, trade, investment, technology transfer, and development cooperation (Zhou 2010), there is a need to point out the operational definition in any study on the subject.

The Nairobi outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation defined it as:

...a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, *inter alia*, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities. South-South cooperation should not be seen as official development assistance. It is a partnership among equals based on solidarity.... South-South cooperation embraces a multi-stakeholder approach, including non-governmental organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and other actors that contribute to meeting development challenges and objectives in line with national development strategies and plans (UN 2010, paras. 18-19).

This definition may not narrow down the concept of SSC but it shows the multitude of partnerships and cooperation agreements Southern countries are engaged in. This not only includes state-to-state cooperation but may also include different stakeholders. Although it is based on the principles that were established by the international community with regards to development cooperation, it is still not essentially considered to be official development assistance (ODA) as termed by the OECD.

There is a need therefore to differentiate between South-South relations on investment, technology transfers, trade, and development cooperation. This primer will focus primarily on the development cooperation aspect of SSC which, according to UN High Level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, is generally considered as:

...a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual or collective development through cooperative exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how (UN 2012a, par. 8).

It is further expounded as initiated, organized, and led by the developing countries themselves with the governments most often playing the lead role but which should also involve other development actors such as CSOs, individuals, and private and public institutions. SSC on development cooperation also includes all sectors and all types of technical cooperation among Southern countries and has a multidimensional scope.

1. Principles of Technical Cooperation in Buenos Aires Plan of Action

The Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) provided the first internationally recognized framework and guideline for technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). It reaffirms the general idea that the purpose of TCDCs is to derive mutual benefits from the sharing of experience and knowledge in the Global South with the aim to achieve their national and collective self-reliance.

The document clearly enumerates basic principles that should serve as the basis for the implementation of any type of TCDCs. One of them is the strict observance of respecting national sovereignty. This principle aims to ensure that TCDCs steer from the traditional use of North-South development assistance which was in part employed as a political tool to influence other countries. It follows that the implementation of TCDCs should be based in complete adherence to non-interference in the domestic affairs of the countries involved. This language shows a clear influence of the shared sentiment of Southern countries in their statements in the Bandung Conference and NAM.

The principle of respecting the nation's economic independence mentioned in BAPA stems from failures of traditional ODA in untying aid and taking away conditionalities. TCDCs are carried out on the basis of equality among the participating countries no matter their social or economic system and their level of development. This disallows the imposition of policies which aim only to benefit one country at the expense of another.

BAPA also reiterates that TCDCs are not a substitute for official development assistance. They serve to transfer adaptable knowledge and skills that are easier shared and implemented in their institutions and societies given the similarity of their experiences. The contribution of developed countries to further hone developing countries' technological capacities is still seen as immensely essential.

2. Yamoussoukro Consensus on South-South Cooperation

In September 2008, the Twelfth Session of the Committee on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries produced the Yamoussoukro Consensus which outlines conceptual framework and principles on South-South Cooperation. This reaffirms the idea in BAPA of how SSC is not a substitute for traditional

North-South ODA. Furthermore, the Consensus agrees on the need to reform the aid architecture to better adapt it to the changing historical and social conditions and the new opportunities for development including triangular cooperation.

The elements outlined in the Consensus that must be part of the conceptual framework are:

- South-South cooperation and its agenda must be driven by the countries of the South;
- South-South cooperation must not be seen as a replacement for North-South cooperation. Strengthening South-South cooperation must not be a measure of coping with the receding interest of the developed world in assisting developing countries.
- Cooperation between countries of the South must not be analyzed and evaluated using the same standards as those used for North-South relations;
- Financial contributions from other developing countries should not be seen as Official Development Assistance from these countries to other countries of the South. These are merely expressions of solidarity and cooperation borne out of shared experiences and sympathies (G77 2008, par.2).

A year after the creation of the Yamoussoukro Consensus, the High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi became the highest arena of international consensus on SSC definition, principles, and framework. It produced the Nairobi outcome document that added other key concepts onto the elements outlined previously.

The outcome document clarifies the different modalities that could be considered SSC. These may include, among others, “the sharing of knowledge and experiences, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions (UN 2010, par.12)”.

As in BAPA, it stressed the importance of respecting the participating countries’ national sovereignty and upholding the ownership of their development process. Conditionalities should not be imposed in any SSC activity. It sees SSC as the initiative of Southern countries born out of their common experiences and goals and is based on the spirit of solidarity. The relationships of the countries involved should therefore be based on a partnership of equals.

III. How is SSC different from traditional ODA?

Considering the definitions and principles discussed above, it is clear that SSDC has distinct characteristics compared to the traditional North-South

development assistance. North-South ODA is premised on the reality of an existing gap among the Northern and the Southern countries within the global economic and political system. This gap is seen not only due to inherent differences in domestic development policies and processes but also due to the global history of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Countries that have undergone or have been created out of colonialism and whose people have been subjugated for centuries go through entirely different developmental stages compared to the North. The imposition of harmful and one-sided policies to these countries by the North after their long struggle for independence has put the Global South at a disadvantaged position. Northern countries thus not only have the capacity to provide the financing and the technical skills but also the ethical obligation to assist in closing the global disparities.

Aside from this historical debt and the need for redistributive justice, developing countries have concrete needs and urgent issues that international development cooperation must address such as eliminating poverty, improving welfare especially health and education, and tackling roots and costs of conflict and war. ODA is the transfer of resources to supplement needs for development and achieve human rights and development goals. This is the fundamental basis for ODA.

In this context, SSDC cannot be equated to ODA nor is it a substitute to the waning development commitments of the Northern countries. Apart from the difference of historical origins, there are established characteristics and principles that set it apart from traditional ODA.

1. Solidarity: The beginning of SSC can be traced to the principle of solidarity among Southern countries. This came in the context of a shared history of colonialism and oppression and the growing disillusionment in North-South relations. Whereas traditional ODA has been used for political and economic means, SSDC differs in that it is founded on shared development goals.

2. Horizontality: The partnerships of countries engaged in SSDC are characterized as horizontal and deviating away from the traditional donor-client relationship. This means the Southern countries involved are not in unbalanced relations of power but rather are negotiating as equals that mutually seek to engage in development cooperation.

3. Demand-driven: This approach differs from traditional ODA in the manner in which the beneficiary country seeks for development assistance. Rather than aid stemming from the supply or the foreign policy and interests of the donor, it derives from the specific demands of Southern countries wanting to receive development assistance. This approach ensures ownership given that development assistance will be aligned to the country's set strategic priorities.

4. Capacity development: This is a significant part of SSDC that differentiates itself with North-South ODA. Capacity development strategies are lauded as a novel and effective form of finding solutions to the development problems faced in the Global South. These strategies strengthen their self-reliance by improving or reforming their institutions and training government personnel to suit the particular needs of their society.

5. Southern knowledge: SSDC exchanges and transfers feature knowledge and experiences of the Global South. This is a contrast to traditional ODA which uses knowledge derived from models of development created in the context of the Global North. SSDC promotes mutual learning and provides new perspectives which are suited to countries that are not yet industrialized and still rely heavily on extractive or agricultural models of production.

6. Adaptability: Due to the similarities of some Southern countries in terms of economy, demographics, and society, SSDC partnerships have high degree of adaptability. Technical cooperation or knowledge-sharing among Southern nations often produce innovative ways of addressing development issues with limited resources which can be put into practice in other countries (Partners in Population and Development).

CHAPTER II

Modalities of SSC

Aid modality refers to the manner in which aid is transferred from the donor to the recipient country. This tool determines how the funds and other resources are to be distributed, how procurement and biddings are carried out, and how donor and recipient institutions interact with one another during the whole process. The choice of aid modality strongly influences the relationship and the effectiveness of the development program.

One of the important contributions of the rise of SSDCs is the diversification of modalities in development. This allows for innovative ways of cooperation between Southern countries with shared interests or goals in producing positive development results that come from their own knowledge and expertise. As well as using the traditional aid modalities, SSDCs rely heavily on non-monetary transfers of skills and knowledge to adapt to the lower resources for development cooperation among Southern countries.

However, due to the fact that SSDCs are not considered ODA and given the lack of internationally recognized definition, some of the modalities used may not follow the principles of development effectiveness nor do participating countries have the obligation to do so. The use of tied aid, the granting of loans to countries with non-democratic or despotic governments, the absence of participatory country ownership, and the lack of framework and guidelines for monitoring and evaluating projects have been consistent critiques to the effectiveness of these novel forms of development cooperation.

Nevertheless, given the increase of development assistance coming from emerging economies and the wide acceptance of the importance of SSDC, changes in development modalities will inevitably happen. These multitude of changes and debates that come out of them would further developments in the current aid architecture.

I. What kinds of technical cooperation initiatives are being done through SSDC?

Since the creation of BAPA in 1978, technical cooperation was the most widely advocated modality in SSDC. The goal of BAPA was to employ TCDC as a way

to achieve national and collective self-reliance and to create the foundations of a new international economic order that is based on equality and respect for national sovereignty. Although the goals still remain to be seen three decades after, the idea of Southern countries cooperating among themselves to achieve sustainable social and economic development forms the basis of TCDCs today.

The increased acceptance of TCDCs can be clearly seen in its inclusion as a key element in the programs of the UN system. In particular, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) play the main role of promoting, developing, and implementing technical cooperation among Southern countries. Other UN organizations that adopted resolutions or decisions to implement the BAPA are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), UNCTAD, and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 2004, the UN Special Unit for TCDC was later renamed as the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation reflecting the expansion of the methods of international cooperation in the Global South.

Technical cooperation is an effective way of transferring skills and knowledge for countries with limited financial resources. This involves capacity development, consultancies, workshops and training, exchange programs, and knowledge-sharing in various sectors and fields of interest. It aims to develop country capability in addressing development challenges by creating strong institutions and enhancing needed skills. This can be done in a bilateral or multilateral manner.

One of the most important examples of TCDC initiative is the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) which is the most active Southern institution that focuses their resources primarily on the provision of technical assistance for development to other Southern countries. Brazilian technical cooperation is largely demand-driven and responds to needs in specific sectors in which it had considerable success. These are often in the thematic scope of education, health, and agriculture (Cabral and Weinstock 2010, 14). This differs from traditional technical cooperation activities in that it is the Southern counterpart itself which proactively seeks for technical assistance from the partner country based on its national priorities and development strategy.

ABC avoids using the term ‘aid’ in defining their development cooperation activities. It prefers to provide technical assistance as its main cooperation modality emphasizing that these partnerships are based on horizontality, non-interference, and mutual benefit. This normally involves government officials or experts relating to their Brazilian counterparts and learning from the Brazilian experience and technological know-how (Cabral et al 2013). Aside from funding traditional stand-alone projects, ABC is taking on a larger role by adopting the ‘groundwork’ project approach. This term refers to projects that were created under the perspective of a long-term, fund-intensive, and large-scale plan (Cabral and Weinstock 2010, 6).

The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) is another national agency created from the country's political commitment to SSC. This features a bilateral program of assistance providing expertise and skills transfer based on the country's development experiences. It provides scholarships for courses, trainings, disaster relief aid, services of Indian experts, and carries out feasibility studies or consulting services for project or program-related activities. This program has benefited students from 156 countries and since its founding in 1964, the Indian government has spent an estimated US\$ 2.5 billion on technical assistance through ITEC (High Commission of India 2012).

South-South cooperation is also an important part of Turkey's development cooperation, and technical cooperation for institutional capacity and human resources development is the main operational activity of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). Sector-wise Turkey provides more resources on education and health. For example, between 2005 and 2010, TIKA projects focused on developing social infrastructure, which was attributed to a 'demand-driven aid policy' that responds to recipients' call to deliver assistance in subsectors such as education, health, water and sanitation, administrative and civil infrastructures that represent basic needs (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

1. SSC technical cooperation on public health

Ensuring people's access to quality healthcare is a crucial component in fulfilling the MDGs particularly on improving maternal health, reducing child mortality, and eradicating diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS. Although there has been a major gain throughout the developing world in terms of reducing child mortality, the data on maternal health and non-communicable diseases show that there is more left to be done.

In Africa, 900 women die for every 100,000 live births which compared to Europe is 27 per 100,000. Despite substantial funding for addressing malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, distribution of treatment to rural communities remain as the biggest challenge. SSC on health has a major resonance in developing countries where lack of resources, technology, and skills limit their capacity to address public health issues (Chaturvedi 2011, 3-4).

The BRICS countries during the Sanya BRICS Summit identified health as an important area of cooperation. This was further reinforced in the Beijing Declaration which was adopted during the BRICS Health Ministers Summit which called for a strengthening of the leadership role of the WHO in the global health agenda. In 2007 to 2008 alone, Brazil, India, China, and South Africa contributed US\$ 200 million in global health initiatives (Ibid, 2). Their health cooperation programs are largely driven by governments and involve inter-governmental agreements.

Brazil has committed to providing universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment since 1996 and this pledge has guided its health cooperation projects with other developing countries. It has worked with Bolivia, Paraguay, Mozambique, and South Africa in providing HIV/AIDS medication. Brazil's commitment to this particular agenda has put it in a diplomatic row with the US over drug patents in 2001 when Brazil threatened to copy AIDS drugs after the refusal of US companies to lower prices (Haddow 2012).

Along with Brazil, India is involved in negotiating trade positions at the WTO for the export of drugs to countries that are in dire need of them. Jointly, both countries have carried out biomedicine research and development projects and set their health agenda in WHO and IBSA (Chaturvedi 2011, 4). China, on the other hand, focuses its development cooperation on health in malaria eradication. It successfully implemented a malaria control program since the 1950s and is currently collaborating with African countries to help stem the disease.

Southern countries in Latin America through the regional cooperation agreements in ALBA are spearheading health cooperation programs. Since Hugo Chavez' presidency in Venezuela, both Cuba and Venezuela have been cooperating closely particularly in the health sector. The beginning of such cooperation was the health-for-oil program which intended to provide support for the Cuban economy by sending subsidized oil in exchange for the health services from Cuban health

Box 1. Cuba's Technical Cooperation in Health

Cuba is a potent example of a Southern country which has made important contributions on SSC on health. The country, with its middle-income status, supports the biggest health cooperation program in the world (Asante et al 2012). It has begun providing healthcare to developing countries since Castro came into power in 1959. The country throughout the succeeding decades suffered embargo of food and medicine. This posed great limitations in its capacity to develop its economy but it has succeeded nonetheless in achieving free universal healthcare and education. Its national healthcare system is lauded as an exemplary model by the WHO and the Pan American Health Organization and its key health indicators are comparable to that of the United States (Feinsilver 2008, 215).

The Cuban health assistance program includes a variety of cooperation activities. The most common method is contracting Cuban medical professionals to work in countries that suffer shortages in health care delivery. According to the newsletter of the Cuban Communist Party, there were reported 38,544 Cuban health professionals working in 75 countries, 17,697 of them doctors (Werlau 2010, 145). It also maintains scholarship programs for foreign students for medical training with the expectation of them returning to work in their countries in order to help improve their healthcare systems. In countries such as Gambia, Haiti, Timor Leste and Yemen, Cuba is involved in supporting domestic medical education through the creation of medical faculties with the help of Cuban academics (Asante et al 2012).

professionals. This is the only collaboration of its kind involving health services in exchange for resources.

Just this year, Brazil is addressing the lack of medical personnel in its national healthcare system by signing a technical cooperation agreement with Cuba. The Mais Medicos Program headed by the Brazilian Ministry of Health became even more relevant after the nationwide protests in June which called for better public services and an end to city violence and corruption. Dilma Rousseff's pledge to improve health care services fast-tracked the cooperation agreement which would send 4,000 doctors, many of them Cuban, to the poor or rural areas in Brazil (Whitefield 2013).

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2. SSC technical cooperation on education

Many countries in the Global South still grapple with improving quality of education and ensuring access to all of its citizens. One of the MDGs to be achieved by 2015 is providing all children full access to primary education and eliminating gender disparities in education. However, according to global statistics on education there still lay crucial challenges ahead. In 2010, there were 61 million children out of school with over half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the world's

adult population, 17% still lack basic literacy skills and two-thirds of them are women (Burnett and Felsman 2012, 5).

Although North-South cooperation in education has been long entrenched as part of aid programs and has contributed to some progress in the sector, SSC creates an alternative space for conceptualizing educational policies and delivering the services to the most marginalized. The postcolonial critique of educational systems in Southern countries provides fuel to the importance of SSC in the field. The inadequacy of educational policies that were created in a colonial or neo-colonial context which no longer serve the countries' development needs could be addressed by new ways of assistance based on the successful experiences of other Southern nations.

SSC in education are carried out bilaterally and multilaterally through regional institutions. An example of regional education alliances is the launching of the Grand National Programs (GNPs) Literacy and Post-Literacy and ALBA-Education in 2008 as part of the different programs in the regional institution, ALBA. Through these programs, three ALBA country members, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia have been declared illiteracy-free. Meanwhile, through ALBA-Education, a resolution has been passed to set up the University of the Peoples of ALBA (UNIALBA), which is set to transform 29 state universities into a network of national territorial universities with a common primary and secondary education curriculum (Muhr 2010, 12-13).

Another multilateral education initiative is the Network of South-South Cooperation among Portuguese-Speaking Countries in the Field of Youth and Adult Education, spearheaded by Brazil. The participating countries Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and East Timor, due to a common history of colonialism also use Portuguese as an official language but until recently they have not been involved in joint cooperation activities. This network holds annual workshops on specific education-related topics which addressed the needs and interests of the participating countries. It seeks to challenge paternalistic and vertical models of cooperation which was a common experience of countries involved (Ribeiro 2011, 16).

An important example of a Southern educational method is Cuba's Yo, Sí Puedo (Yes I Can) literacy program. This method pioneered a grassroots approach to teaching which focused on training local teachers allowing them to teach the students in a language that is familiar to them. Due to its apparent success throughout the years resulting in a current literacy rate ranging from 97% and 99.8%, the method has been exported to 28 countries (Steele 2008, 33). In 2012, the Cuban government has signed a cooperation agreement with the Haitian government for the implementation of the Yo, Sí Puedo program.

II. What are the characteristics of development financing on infrastructure in SSC?

Development financing is an important aspect of traditional ODA. The aid commitments of Northern countries go towards funding programs and projects in the Global South that would help achieve the internationally agreed development goals. It funds socio-economic development programs in the most vulnerable and poorest countries and finances humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, traditional development financing plays an important role in meeting credit demand from developing countries which is often used to address bottlenecks in infrastructure.

The growth of the emerging economies exemplified by BRICS spells new ways of providing development financing. With the financial crisis slowing down growth of the Northern economies, some of the developing countries are stepping in to bridge the gap. These countries have been increasing their contribution in multilateral development banks. In 2012, the BRICS countries pledged a contribution of US\$70 billion to IMF to counteract the effects of the European debt crisis. At the same time, they renewed their calls for a voting power that reflects their contribution (Russian Today 2012).

Given their disappointment in the slow reform in the Bretton Woods institutions, the BRICS countries increasingly provide development assistance outside the existing multilateral development banks. China, Brazil, and India have been providing concessional or preferential loans for infrastructure through bilateral deals with other Southern governments.

Development Banks of some BRICS countries	Services Provided
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)	It provides long-term financing with subsidized interest rates to serve as investments for infrastructure and industrial development. BNDES also supports social investments (Stuenkel 2013)
Exim Bank of China	It provides financing mostly in the fields of infrastructure to foreign governments and investment loans to private Chinese companies operating overseas. The Bank gives concessional loans and export buyer's credit for developing countries (Tan 2011)
Exim Bank of India	The Bank provides a line of concessional credits to developing partner countries.

This is met with huge demand from developing countries which suffer from a global deficit in infrastructure financing. Infrastructure investment is needed to ensure people's access to potable water, electricity, telecommunication, and transportation. Availability of this kind of financing directly affects the country's capacity to meet the MDGs. Developing countries also need to address infrastructure investment gaps in order to promote long-term growth and productivity (Estache

2010, 63). This is especially relevant for some of Africa's landlocked Sub-Saharan countries with low population densities which given the low purchasing power makes infrastructure maintenance and investments expensive (Goldstein and Kauffman 2006).

The BRICS countries therefore primarily focus their development financing for the infrastructure sector. Among the group, China and India provide the most substantial support for development financing with the combined financing already in comparable magnitude to that provided by traditional donors.

The Chinese government grants interest-free loans for social infrastructure projects such as medical centers, schools, and government buildings. It also provides support for productive infrastructure through the granting of credit lines and preferential loans. One of the landmark examples of such financing was the Chinese support of 1,800 km Tanzania–Zambia railway which was funded through a US\$ 400-million interest free loan. In 2006, China has committed an estimated US\$5 billion in development assistance in infrastructure to Sub-Saharan Africa (Hodgson et al, 2).

However, country priorities are influenced by China's growing domestic need for energy. 70% of its infrastructure investments in Africa are concentrated in four countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria (Butterfield et al 2008). China's investment strategy which is termed the "Angolan model" mixes financing for infrastructure development with rights to use natural resources as collateral, Chinese direct investment, and the contracting of Chinese companies to construct the project (Hodgson et al, 5). These investments are often made with the interest of complementing the Chinese economy through stimulating the production of specific goods or products in the given country.

India, on the other hand, primarily finances infrastructure projects related to the energy and transport sector. Its development financing comes in the form of loans, grants, and credit lines (Mwaze and Yang 2012, 8). It traditionally channels the bulk of its development assistance for infrastructure to its neighbouring countries, Bhutan and Nepal, with these infrastructure projects normally related to improving the health and education sectors. Its development cooperation is in line with the country's priorities of strengthening regional integration (OECD 2012b, 6).

India's concessional credits from the Exim Bank of India are primarily channelled to the African region with Ethiopia, Sudan, DR Congo, Mali, Mozambique, Ghana, and Senegal being the top aid loan recipients. These loans are mostly used to finance infrastructure projects in different sectors such as energy, electricity, transport, and irrigation. Much like in Chinese development assistance in infrastructure, companies from the lending country are contracted to carry out the construction or deliver the goods needed in project implementation (OECD 2012b, 9). A major interest in Africa by India is the search for natural resources

and new markets in investment that will help improve domestic economic growth (UN 2012b, 7).

Development financing on infrastructure by the emerging economies are highly complex. This often involves tight bundling of trade, loans, and foreign direct investment which makes it difficult to differentiate aid from typical investment financing. Despite this, a greater understanding of how these new providers of development financing work is becoming more important given the extent of loans they issue. China sets the example of the “Angolan model” as a new method of this kind of financing within the African region and the projects implemented through this method now comprise 21% of all infrastructure projects in the region (Ibid, 3).

III. How is aid for trade being carried out in the context of SSC?

The aid for trade initiative launched by the WTO during the 2005 Ministerial in Hong Kong was a recognition of the exclusion of developing countries in the global trading system. It is noteworthy that this initiative comes after the failures of the WTO Ministerial Conferences since Seattle in 1999 which have ended with mistrust and walkouts of developing countries protesting the unfair trade deals coming out of WTO negotiations.

This crisis of confidence in the WTO stems from the unmet promises of the Uruguay Round in 1995 which brought substantial strides in influencing the adoption of free trade policies among member countries. Inclusion of developing countries in the deal was supposedly meant to provide benefits in terms of lower tariffs for its products and thus stimulate economic growth. OECD studies estimated gains at US\$ 200 to US\$ 500 billion from the adoption of the market liberalization agreements from the Uruguay Round (Martin and Winters 1997, 428).

It did not take long for developing countries to see the unfairness of the deal and the negative repercussions to their economies. The Uruguay Round involved an unbalanced focus towards services, intellectual property, and industrial manufacturing which are mainly in the interest of developed countries. Meanwhile, there was little attention given to advancing trade in agriculture and textiles which are the main export products of developing countries. The limits to agricultural subsidies effectively reduced the competitiveness of developing countries. Furthermore, the more stringent requirements on intellectual property rights meant higher cost to medicine and healthcare to the countries with poorer and more vulnerable populations at the expense of protecting multinational pharmaceutical companies in developing countries (Charlton and Stiglitz 2012, 4).

These contributed to the mistrust of WTO and the failures of the subsequent processes. Instead, multilateral deals on furthering trade liberalization lost steam to the growth of regional trade alliances. At the imminent threats of institutional loss of credibility, WTO later admitted that there is more to be done to ensure the benefits of free trade to developing countries. This is the reason why the Doha Development Agenda prominently featured a focus on the interests and needs of developing countries and small and vulnerable economies.

The Aid for Trade Initiative was then conceptualized and implemented from this polemic issue. To continue the WTO agenda of pushing market liberalization in an era of strong doubts over its promises of economic development meant having to recognize the inequalities of the global trade system and proposing a solution to it. The initiative aims to address what the WTO admits to be the problem encountered by developing countries which are lack of infrastructure, weak productive capacities, trade policies that are unsuitable for a free market system.

Currently, 25% of ODA is considered as part of the aid for trade initiative (OECD 2011a). Emerging economies such as China and India are channelling a great proportion of their aid towards aid for trade. Aside from China and India, the major Southern contributors identified are Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. There has also been a notable increase of demand from LDCs and developing countries for technical assistance from these Southern contributors.

India which used to be a major recipient of aid for trade is now a leading South-South provider. The country has given priority to the initiative as shown in its participation in Regional Technical Group on Aid for Trade for the Asia-Pacific (RGT) in 2009. It was also among the 13 primary members of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative in the WTO.

India's trade-related activities are mainly concentrated on providing technical assistance to increase productive capacities, concessional lending, infrastructure funding, and preferential trading. They are often part of India's regional cooperation efforts within the framework of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), and the ASEAN-Indian cooperation agreement.

India has also shown a strong trading interest in the African region. The bilateral trade between India and Africa has exponentially increased growing from US\$ 1 billion in 2001 to US\$ 50 billion in 2011-2012. The recognition of Africa being a strategic trade partner has clearly influenced India's development cooperation in the region. Since 2008, it has been implementing the Duty-Free Trade Preference (DFTP) scheme to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which

provide their products duty-free and quota-free market access in India (Ancharaz and Laird 2013).

The Techno-Economic Approach for Africa and India Movement (TEAM-9) initiative is another example of India's aid for trade activities. This provides 8 countries in Western Africa access to concessional credits worth US\$ 500 million. This program sought to promote socio-economic development through facilitating these countries purchase of Indian technological products or equipment (Humphrey 2011).

China is another major Southern player in the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. Much like India, China's SSC is focused on economic cooperation and technical assistance. The country was also one of the 13 members of the Task Force on Aid for Trade and has contributed financial resources for an aid program that sought to facilitate the LDCs membership and negotiating capacity in the WTO.

Its aid for trade program benefits Southern countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Although there is no expressed regional strategy for the initiative, China has shown a clear interest in creating trade links through aid with Africa. The region is now considered to be the country's most important development partner. In 2002, it has established the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) which is a consultation platform and dialogue mechanism on political and economic cooperation between Africa and China. It has also set up a US\$ 5 billion fund to facilitate Chinese FDI in Africa (Chahoud 2007, 3).

Defining China's aid for trade program is problematic due to the unclear distinction between trade, investment, and aid. Chinese aid is often largely packaged as trade deals and investments with a blend of concessional loans and export credits. However, much of its aid programs or projects in the transport, energy, and telecommunication sectors fall within the scope of aid for trade.

Brazil also participates in the Aid-for-Trade Initiative albeit through technical assistance and not through development financing. An example of this is its technical assistance to Cotton 4 comprised of the African countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. This project supports agricultural technology and knowledge transfers spearheaded by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária – EMBRAPA). Apart from that, it aims to organize a more uniform and profitable cotton supply chain which countered the effects of the previous losses incurred by these four countries due to subsidy policies in the international market (OECD 2011b).

The aid for trade initiative of the BRICS nations straddle the line between their interests and advantage as emerging economies whilst still being identified as Southern nations. An example of the contradiction is seen in the economic growth of India, China, and Brazil which has been helped by import substitution,

a strategy which is counter to the market liberalization espoused by the WTO. But on the other hand, the WTO agenda allows them access to new markets for export and sources for raw or extractive materials.

The BRICS group notably engages in the multilateral trading system while at the same time forges regional trade alliances. China, India and Brazil's aid for trade mirror their interest in Africa as a strategic partner in terms of widening market access and expanding their investments in the region. These countries are also participants of regional trade blocs such as the SAARC for India and Mercosur for Brazil.

IV. What knowledge-sharing platforms are being created among Southern countries?

Knowledge-sharing is seen as an important development tool for Southern countries. These efforts for mutual learning provide potential benefits for governments and civil society organizations in utilizing their own development experiences and adapting it to their social and cultural context. This departs from the old notion of a "one size fits all" strategy to development which imposes the use of development strategies that were taken from the experience of Northern countries, often in stark contrast to the realities of the Global South where financing, infrastructure and technology are limited.

Knowledge exchanges can be done in the regional or global level and may include the participation of a diverse range of development actors from the local or national government, CSOs, academic institutions, and the private sector. Its purpose is commonly to share technical know-how in different fields of interest, exchange experiences on successful public policies, and add on to the existing knowledge and information through the sharing of good practices implemented in diverse socio-cultural and economic contexts.

The High-Level Meeting "Towards Country-Led Knowledge Hubs" in Bali in 2012 was the most significant gathering of policymakers from 46 countries with the expressed aim of furthering the building of knowledge hubs. This meeting reflected the growing international interest in knowledge-sharing as a development tool that can complement and even be a vital component of other development modalities such as finance and technical cooperation in the aim to address poverty and promote sustainable development.

In 2010, the G20 appointed the UNDP and the Task Team on South-South Cooperation to jointly create policy recommendations and proposals on scaling up knowledge-sharing as a development tool. Out of this initiative, knowledge-sharing was included as one of the nine pillars of the Multi-Year Work Plan of the

G20 Development Working Group. Its Steering Committee informs and monitors the progress of knowledge-sharing and supports actions and concerted efforts in developing its bilateral or multilateral knowledge platforms.

Aside from global initiatives to scale-up the use of knowledge-sharing, there has also been much interest in the formation of regional information platforms. The Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) was a product of the Ibero-American Conference which is held annually and attended by the heads of state of 22 Spanish or Portuguese-speaking countries. SEGIB was formed in 2003 to contribute to regional strengthening and coordinating development cooperation among the member states. It also serves as a regional knowledge-sharing platform for country experiences and good practices in institutional capacity development.

Evidence and Lessons for Latin America (ELLA) is a knowledge sharing and learning platform formed by the UK Department for International Development. Despite being created by a Northern development agency, this platform provides access to information and experiences specifically on economic development, environmental management, and governance in the Latin American region. It also aims to support learning alliances between countries in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia on themes varying from extractive industries, climate change adaptation, citizen oversight, small-scale farming, climate resilient cities, to human rights.

Another example on good practice in regional knowledge sharing is the basin-South Asia Regional Knowledge Platform. This was created in 2004 with the aim to promote knowledge systems and collaborative actions within South Asia to ensure the poor's access to sustainable housing and livelihood. The Platform facilitates dialogues among important actors, promotes collaboration and knowledge exchange among livelihood and housing agencies in the region, and provides expertise and know-how on institutional strengthening, capacity development, technology and financing for sustainable livelihood and housing.

There are also country-led knowledge hubs being hosted by national development cooperation agencies such as that of the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID) which brings together 27 in-country knowledge hubs (Pradhan 2012). Meanwhile, Indonesia shares development experiences and information from four ministries through its National Coordination Team on South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

V. What is Triangular Cooperation?

While there is no agreed definition on triangular cooperation, it generally involves two or more developing country partners collaborating with a developed country in transfers of expertise and resources. It may also involve bilateral development providers, international organizations, and/or Southern partners. UNDP cites that:

“Triangular South-South co-operation is becoming increasingly popular as a way of fostering development by leveraging the best features of cooperation between developing countries with assistance from developed countries” (2004).

An OECD survey on triangular cooperation done in 2012 showed that this type of cooperation happens in every region, with a sectoral concentration on government and civil society, agriculture, health and multi-sector/cross-cutting issues. The volume was difficult to estimate, as many respondents could not provide the exact number of their triangular activities or the amount of financial resources involved. The Inter-American Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank reported the largest number of triangular cooperation activities (between 50 and 100). Most providers and international organizations invested less than USD 10 million per year; and most developing countries received less than USD 5 million in total through triangular cooperation (OECD 2013).

The United Nations promotes this aid modality through the UNDP’s Special Unit for South South Cooperation and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC). This new modality is being lauded as a more effective way of providing aid which taps into the distinctive capacities of both the developing and developed countries and moves away from the traditional North to South transfer of expertise and goods. Its main strength is that the skills and solution used will be replicable in Southern countries given the similarities in conditions and limitations in terms of infrastructure and technology among the Southern collaborators.

Another positive aspect of triangular cooperation is its cost effectiveness. The expertise and technology available in Southern countries are adapted to low-income consumers. Many Southern countries are known producers of good quality but cheaper medicines, IT products, vehicles, and other equipment. Triangular cooperation also comes without associated conditionalities.

The motivations behind triangular cooperation are three-fold. One is to build and improve the capacity of Southern development providers. The second is to strengthen the relations of the Northern country and their Southern partners. Thirdly, it may aim to strengthen the relations among Southern collaborators and promote regional integration (Yamashiro 2009, 8).

After a long period of civil strife in Mozambique, agricultural production remained dismal and contributed to poverty in the farming communities in the country. Added to this problem was that the irrigation systems built during the Portuguese occupation was severely damaged during the civil war and were no longer functional. In 2011, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) embarked on a triangular cooperation with Vietnam and Mozambique in the aim to share farming techniques that would be suitable to the land conditions and improve the capacity of farmers to produce better yield.

Vietnam was chosen as a collaborator because of its distinctive experience as a prolific rice-producing country. It also has technological limitations similar to that experienced by the agricultural sector in Mozambique. Both lack agricultural machinery and farming equipments that would easily be accessible in developed economies. The tropical climate conditions are also the same in both countries and therefore the techniques could easily be applicable to the other.

JICA was in charge of the financial and administrative aspect of the cooperation project while the Vietnamese counterparts were those primarily involved in skills transfer and technical guidance. Given the low cost of the actual project, the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique would be able to apply the same methods and techniques countrywide (JICA 2012).

Triangular cooperation however presents challenges in coordination. Countries involved may have different institutional procedures affecting the length of negotiations and ultimately the cost. Another challenge encountered is the lack of comprehensive data of triangular cooperation activities being carried out all over the world. Also, evaluation and monitoring of these activities are needed to assess effectiveness and measure contributions to the current development structure.

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is one agency that has resolved to use the opportunities for triangular cooperation more, though it notes that inclusion of a third party in a development activity “places complex demands on political dialogue and on the planning and

Box 2. Triangular Cooperation among Vietnam, Japan and Mozambique

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implementation process.” It identified several challenges for the different parties involved:

1. For beneficiary country: Poor coordination between partners can place a considerable additional strain on structures in the third country and can lead to further fragmentation of donor efforts; cooperation involving an emerging economy that is a neighbor or comes from within the region can be politically sensitive; if interests of cooperation partners are not aligned or run counter with its development interests, the beneficiary country is under risk; triangular cooperation that is not based on equal partnership can further strain relations between the beneficiary country and the Southern player especially if these relations are politically or historically affected
2. For emerging economy: Triangular cooperation can place additional burden and involve high transaction costs; if partners do not operate as equals, the emerging economy may find its opportunities to contribute and influence the project limited by the other donor; it may also be confronted with questions about the quality and design of its cooperation and instruments and also about its motivation
3. German development cooperation: Triangular cooperation can be more demanding in terms of coordination and time than bilateral cooperation and thus entail higher transaction costs; questions may also arise on ensuring ownership on the part of the beneficiary country or how to deal with an emerging economy for which development policy interests may not have top priority; greater difficulty to implement projects dealing with strategic or political issues than projects of a purely technical nature (BMZ 2013)

The new approaches and modalities that have sprung out of SSC have added to the complexity of international development cooperation. SSC has been formed through the shared history and common development challenges faced by Southern countries. It also reflects current political and economic changes going on in the globe made apparent by the increasing participation of the emerging economies represented by BRICS. This dynamism in the aid architecture provides the opportunity to thoroughly study and assess its value and its potential to create a more inclusive and just development.

CHAPTER III.

Value of SSC

International organizations and multilateral institutions praise the greater cooperation of Southern countries. The UN, for one, is very much convinced of its positive contributions to meeting the development goals that it has committed to advocating the use of SSC among its agencies. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon puts it, SSC “has the potential to balance growth and equity on a global scale. Even in the midst of severe economic, social and political instabilities, South-South cooperation has continued to drive buoyant trade and financial flows in recent years... South-South cooperation holds great potential for even greater sharing of expertise in areas such as education, health, energy and food security” (UN Secretary General 2012).

The crucial question in the recent growing number of studies on SSC is its added value to the traditional aid architecture. The multitude of approaches and modalities coming from SSC can further develop the manner aid is conceptualized and delivered but this maybe at the expense of ensuring the internationally agreed on guidelines for development effectiveness. There is also lively debate on the extent of its capacity to influence not only the theory and practice of development but also to challenge the hegemonic hold of the West on the international development institutions and processes.

If so, SSC provides the Global South an alternative space for them to cooperate amongst themselves to achieve shared development goals based on equality and mutual benefit—conditions hardly in practice in traditional North-South aid.

I. What were the weaknesses and problems of traditional development paradigm that encouraged the development of SSC?

SSC was historically seen as a reaction to the marginalization of the Southern countries in the international arena. Throughout the World Wars and the Cold War, the Northern nations held the power to act to further their political and economic interests whilst dragging Southern countries into the global conflict. The bipolarity of international politics of that time brought about the need for a coalition for non-alignment which was represented by the Bandung Conference and NAM.

Foreign aid during the Cold War period was doled out to Southern countries based on geopolitical objectives. For the US and its allies this meant providing aid with explicit political conditionalities. It was given out to strategic allies to halt the spread of Soviet influence and it was conditioned on recipient countries' adoption of democratic reforms, although a blind eye was turned on autocratic governments that were strategic allies (Dunning 2009, 409-412).

The multilateral institutions and international organizations that were formed after World War II brought with them the same mechanisms of exclusion. Decision-making processes in these arenas are concentrated in the hands of powerful nations. The Bretton Woods institutions are primarily controlled by the US and Europe while the UN Security Council only has five countries as permanent members exclusively wielding veto powers. The development paradigm that came from this historical and political context was largely a reflection of it.

The IMF and WB dictated the trajectory of development assistance in the second half of the 20th century. This characterized a development based on neoclassical economics as advocated by the Washington Consensus. It posits that transforming a nation's economy to suit its insertion to the global capitalist system through changes in its macroeconomic policies would bring about economic development. This was the rationale for the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were imposed as conditions for developing countries to have access to development financing.

The positive effects of macroeconomic stability through the SAPs on poverty reduction and improving standards of living of the general population were however refuted by global statistics. Throughout the 1990s the number of people living in poverty increased by an estimated 100 million despite the world income actually increasing by 2.5% on average annually during the same period (Stiglitz 2000, 7). Furthermore, the volatility of a deregulated world market led to periodic global and regional crises which directly affected the poorest and most marginalized population due to the increased domestic unemployment and austerity measures on basic services.

Development was seen as a top-down process that relied on recreating the successful economic models of industrialized nations to the Global South. As Stiglitz put it, "in dictating the terms of the agreements, the IMF effectively stifles any discussions within a client government – let alone more broadly within the country – about alternative economic policies" (2002, 43). This verticality in aid was also seen in practice which advocated policy reforms and delivered services that were prescriptions of what the donor country thought the recipient country needed thus effectively stifling country ownership of the development process.

Studies on the effect of neoliberal capitalist policies in Sub-Saharan Africa saw the region in a downward economic spiral due to the rapid opening up of its markets

in the mid-1980s. The reasons cited was the deindustrialization due to excessive global competition, reliance on extractive or primary products, vulnerability to exogenous shocks, and capital flights of foreign investors due to speculation. These in effect saw poverty rates and inequality continually increasing from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. ODA statistics also show that much of the aid channelled to Africa consist of debt relief and debt repayment. Furthermore, the emphasis on meeting the MDGs for 2015 has funnelled aid towards social services at the expense of improving productive capacities to ensure long-term development (Sundaram et al 2011, 11-12).

Given the failures, an alternative to this development paradigm was being sought by Southern nations which saw themselves as victims of the Washington Consensus. This fomented the surge of regional alliances and blocs among Southern countries with the aim of gaining more negotiating power in multilateral institutions and international organizations that are highly influenced by Northern countries. In some instances, regional alliances were formed to create an alternative to the neoliberal capitalist system such as what is seen in the formation of ALBA.

II. What are the alternatives SSC presents vis-a-vis traditional Northern development cooperation?

The call for a shift in development paradigm is gaining strength among nations of the Global South. The changes called for have much to do with changing the vertical relationship of aid which marked the unequal power relations between the donor and the recipient. Currently, a shared conviction is emerging among Southern nations in cooperating on equal footing and gaining knowledge from one another's development experiences. The increase of regional trade also comes from the motivation of the Global South to counteract the consequences of trade liberalization imposed by the IMF and WTO.

Amartya Sen's human development approach which is central to UNDP's Human Development Report marks a shift in conceptualizing development. Mahbub ul Haq, at the launching of the Human Development Report expressed its primary purpose which was "to shift the focus of development economics from national income accounting to people-centered policies" (1995). This means a reprioritization of the approach and method of achieving the development goals from the emphasis on macroeconomic stability or charity-based provision of social services towards political empowerment and improving people's capacities and broadening their choices.

SSC's emphasis on sharing knowledge and experiences in finding solutions to development challenges in the Global South complements the idea of an alternative to the North-South transfers. SSC affirms the need for the Southern countries to

take the lead in setting their development agenda and priorities free from the vested interests of more powerful donor countries. SSC among NGOs such as that with Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO working in the poverty-stricken communities of Haiti, exemplify a more bottom-up and decentralized approach to development cooperation (Oliveira 2010). The knowledge hubs and the sharing of technical know-how also complement a more people-oriented approach that often involves a diversity of actors and promotes the use of knowledge and experiences that can be adapted in the local setting.

The aid for trade activities among Southern countries also bring a different perspective on economic development cooperation. The BRICS countries particularly support aid for trade not only through multilateral trade arrangements such as the WTO but also are increasingly engaged in regional trade alliances with closer developing neighbours and the African region. These regional trading blocs of Southern countries have the potential to mitigate the negative effects of global free trade to their economies. The concentration of South-South technical assistance on addressing capacity and skills gaps shows how this type of cooperation aims to address structural hurdles to economic growth.

The inequality of power in the donor-recipient relationship which was the norm in traditional North-South transfer, made apparent by the SAPs and conditionalities on political and economic reforms, influenced how the Chinese and Indian government currently provide aid. These countries controversially do not impose political conditionalities on their development financing and assistance. This character of aid from emerging economies marks how the emerging countries' SSC shakes the purportedly universal Northern values of "good governance" and the guidelines on with which country to cooperate. This lack of conditionality however has brought in criticism from traditional donors which will be discussed in the next chapter.

SSDC provides distinct alternatives to traditional development cooperation. Its activities intend to do away with the "one size fits all" prescriptions that characterized SAPs. It instead focuses on adapting solutions that were formulated in countries with similar stages of development. The benefits of development partnership and a horizontal relationship are evident in the more equal capacity to negotiate agreements, especially on trade and development financing, on mutually beneficial terms.

However, it is also evident that SSDC does not necessarily ensure a break from the traditional development paradigm. Since aid from SSDC only represents less than 10% of the total ODA, its capacity to change the paradigm and architecture of development is limited. What it contributes with the most significance is the multitude of approaches and modalities that could set as positive examples to the international development community, which could exert pressures for future reforms.

Although the increasing decentralization of development cooperation allows a space for CSOs from the Global South to affect a more participatory and democratic development, it is still not clear whether SSDC in general will be utilizing a more people-centered approach to development.

III. Does SSC really increase the Southern countries' self-reliance and freedom to independently choose their own development path?

SSC has undoubtedly opened up space to create alternatives to the hegemonic hold of the North on the discourse on development. The traditional development paradigm is closely intertwined with the Northern influence on the global economy and politics. SSC may therefore hold the potential to create a space for development cooperation which is far from interference and the vested interests of more powerful nations. However, the extent of its capacity to provide Southern countries the gateway for more independence in choosing their development path is not yet clear.

What is evident from the blocs and alliances formed by Southern countries is that there is a growing multiplicity of ideas of governance on trade, politics, development, and public policies, among others. Their cooperation activities challenge the notion of a hegemonic system governing all matters of international interest. SSC on trade, in particular, points towards a resistance to neoliberal trade prescriptions as the primary and sole strategy to achieve national economic development. The rationale for trade alliances and blocs among Southern nations is further supported by the theory of complementarity which suggests that trade among countries with similar levels in economic development produces more equitable benefits over-all for the members involved.

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) which was put forward in UNCTAD aimed to advocate an international trade system that takes into account the participation of developing countries through preferential trade, creation of associations for primary commodities, and no-strings-attached development assistance. This runs counter to free market policies advocated by the WTO and IMF.

The proliferation of SSC activities on increasing trade and improving productive capacities among Southern countries often aim to supplement regional trade bloc formation. Some of these regional trade blocs are alternatives to the neoliberal capitalism advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions. ALBA's regional integration initiative promotes free trade and the elimination of tariff barriers on certain products but it advocates a development that focuses on social gains such as poverty reduction and ensuring the basic necessities of their population.

ALBA's Higher Education for All (HEFA) program, Muhr argues, is counter-hegemonic in its rejection of "the commoditization of education and the production of an entrepreneurial-competitive global elite" as part of a capitalist economy (19). Venezuela's cooperation agreements with Cuba and Iran see a carving up of space for Southern countries with a clear stance against US global hegemony to form alternative economic and political systems.

The creation of the BRICS Development Bank is lauded by economists as a response to the need for other institutions other than those of the Bretton Woods. Despite the rhetoric of a "new paradigm" in the Fifth BRICS Summit in Durban, expectations of a radical change to the development architecture are kept at a minimum. There is yet no clear indication of how the bank will work in practice but the change of paradigm in question is not of development cooperation but rather of the shift of economic power from the North to the emerging economies. It calls into question whether the institution although formed by emerging economies will merely reproduce North-South relations.

The vocabulary used in the BRICS Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework is distinct from WTO agreements with a prominent mention of "mutually beneficial outcomes... with an emphasis on supporting industrial complementarities, sustainable development and inclusive growth" (2013a). Ultimately, this alliance aims to give the BRICS countries more negotiating power in the WTO and promote trade and investment coordination and knowledge exchange among the member nations. The BRICS group pose a challenge to the Northern mode of economic development because despite their capitalist economies, their transformation as emerging economic powers did not strictly follow the Northern neoliberal route, nor do they continue to follow neoclassical economic prescriptions.

In 2010, UNCTAD presented its idea of a new international development architecture (NIDA) which recognized the critical importance of aid to LDCs but with a need to use an integrated aid-plus approach. It is based on the notion that development assistance to LDCs should take into account global interdependency in terms of economic development and poverty reduction. This advocates support to domestic resource mobilization, measures to reduce commodity price volatility, and debt relief. NIDA moves away from the "one size fits all" strategy and instead empowers LDCs to draw on their assets and potentials. It also places the States in a more significant position in guiding and stimulating the private sector.

SSC has clearly opened up a multiplicity of international cooperation or coalitions based on a diverse range of shared interests. It provides a crucial opening up of alternatives and space for dialogue no longer limited to Northern countries' sphere of influence.

IV. What global initiatives are there to promote SSC?

The United Nations through its Office for South-South Cooperation aims “to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation globally and within the United Nations system” (UNSSC). The Office is in charge of mainstreaming SSC into the UN agencies and programs, engaging diverse development actors, and serves as Secretariat for the High-Level Committee on South-South Cooperation. The High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development in Bogota held in 2010 was aimed to get together Southern countries to review the experiences and challenges of SSC and jointly create an outline forward. It saw further support in fostering SSC initiatives and improving its practice and effectiveness.

G77 has held international summits with particular significance to SSC. After the Havana South Summit of 2000 where a review of the progress of SSC was made, the Marrakesh Declaration adopted in 2003 reaffirmed the commitment of member countries to promote capacity development and technology transfers, eliminating trade barriers, and increasing direct investments. It also created a framework with established development goals and strategies for member countries. This was followed by the Doha Plan of Action in 2005 which saw the need to revitalize and make efforts in strengthening SSC and recognized it as complementary and not a substitute to North-South development assistance. The Meetings that followed continually reaffirmed support to SSC activities, the need for monitoring and reviewing of these activities, and also the need to mobilize financial resources.

UNCTAD in presenting NIDA cited SSDC as an important component of this vision. It sees it as key to ensuring LDC-specific support among other developing countries in terms of preferential trade and technology transfers. SSC promotion is based on UNCTAD’s advocacy to deepen regional integration, support knowledge exchange and technology transfers, and facilitate cooperation in renewable energy production.

V. What are the challenges encountered in the emergence of SSC?

In the context of crisis, decline of ODA and the post-Cold War, SSC is a relatively new endeavour by Southern countries to find a new way of working cooperatively towards meeting their development goals. Despite the novelty of it, the international development community has thrown in their support for the promotion of SSC. This is because of the undeniable benefits of the approaches and modalities that would not have been created if development cooperation has relied on traditional ODA alone.

But precisely because of its novelty, there are still gaps and lapses that are associated with SSC.

There are important issues that need to be confronted if the international development community is to fully support the promotion of SSC activities. There is a need to assure that development actors, much like what is expected of traditional ODA, are accountable to their citizens and their development partners. It is also important to build on the strengths of SSC to more efficiently deliver results.

Emerging countries have great reluctance to declare their SSC activities as ODA. This is due to the countries' distinct characteristic of straddling between the developed and developing world. Despite the growing strength of their economies, using taxpayers' money for development cooperation often draws criticisms from their constituents given that a significant portion of the population is still under poverty and lacking basic social services. Moreover, there is also the legitimate fear that this would decrease potential ODA from Northern donors as emerging countries still receive a significant amount of ODA. This also underlines the reality that there is significant difference between the big players – the BRICS – and the smaller ones whose own context still require substantial development assistance.

While SSC actors have engaged with the effectiveness process, in Busan they only agreed that “The principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis.” There has been recurring criticisms of the main SSC players in terms of some practices that go against the principles of development effectiveness. According to a 2011 study for the Development Cooperation Forum, the majority of Southern development assistance is tied to procurement of goods or services from the provider (UN DCF 2011). India, China, and Venezuela are cited as countries that use tied-aid in SSDC (Reality of Aid 2010, 14)

Nevertheless, the new SSC providers differentiate themselves from Northern donors which impose policy conditionalities for development financing or assistance. This decision comes from their position as aid recipients and their stance on the principle of non-interference. There are, however, fears that this “no strings attached” policy would undermine democratic ownership of national development since this means these new providers would have no qualms about lending or providing assistance to autocratic or illegitimate governments. There is no human rights or good governance criteria in determining whether to support a partner country with development loans or assistance. This also raises questions on the sustainability of debts being incurred especially by African countries that have spotty records on fiscal management.

The manner in which China, in particular, cooperates with other Southern countries is seen as contrary to the same principle. The Chinese government negotiates and channels its development assistance exclusively through the partner

government. There is no CSO involvement in the Chinese SSDC and therefore does not facilitate democratic processes in development partnerships.

There are also questions as to BRICS' interest in Africa. Brazil, China, and India's recent foray into cooperation agreements with countries in the region which were traditionally not strategic partners is argued to be part of their strategic political and economic interests. The region is undeniably a large strategic market and access to its extractive resources is highly important to boost the BRICS economies. India's development assistance to Africa is seen to largely be composed of export subsidy schemes for their surplus products. Indian aid is characterized to be tied to the procurement of its goods and services, which places it in a contradictory position given that the Indian government itself does not accept tied bilateral aid (Bijoy 2010, 74).

China's motives for its presence in the region also stem from the country's need for energy and food security and its search for new markets for their products. With China now overtaking the US as the top energy importer in the world, its priority countries in Africa for development assistance reflects this interest. This in part may explain the channelling of trade agreements, aid, and investments in resource-rich countries such as Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria. India's foreign relations with East African countries and its cooperation with eight resource-rich Francophone countries in Team-9 are also highly influenced by the need to find vital sources for energy imports.

There are also concerns raised that the developing countries' need for food security in a context of volatile global food prices and the growing demand is fuelling the incidents of land-grabbing in Africa. These involve the lease or the acquisition of agricultural or arable land to foreign investors often facilitated by the government of the country where the land is leased or sold. According to a FAO study, many Southern countries are involved in land deals in Sub-Saharan Africa particularly Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Cotula et al 2009, 17). Cited foreign investors that have procured or leased lands in Africa include China, India, South Korea, and Gulf-based countries (Smith 2009).

Looking at how SSC is conducted by the BRICS group, there are contentions with the concept of a radical change in development paradigm. It is argued that this merely shows an ongoing shift in global power from the Northern countries to the emerging nations. The formations and alliances that the bloc has created have the goal to increase its negotiating power in the international arena. BRICS' incursion into Africa and their tied-aid and search for extractive resources disturbingly mimic Northern economic interests.

Conclusion

Currently, there is yet no established definition of SSC and to add to its complexity, there are multiplicities of cooperation agreements in different themes encompassing trade and investments, health, security, energy, and development cooperation among countries of the Global South. The main reason for this gap in definition, framework, and guidelines is that this is still a relatively novel set-up in international relations.

The previous chapters gave an overview of the history of its inception and the rationale for supporting the rise of SSC. Also discussed was its capacity to create an alternative space for the Global South to choose their own development path and foment international cooperation that is based on partnerships, respect for national sovereignty, and mutual benefits. From this background, it can be inferred that SSC is an aspect of the many ways of engaging diverse nations in cooperating for common goals and there is a pivotal opening for the international community to build on its capacity to provide alternatives. This may provide opportunities to create alternative international and regional political, trade, and economic systems that potentially pose a challenge to Northern hegemony on international governance systems.

SSDC in itself is not the panacea to the problems of international development cooperation in terms of the failures in implementation and outcomes, the inequality in decision-making processes of international organizations, and the lack of commitment to development cooperation and its effectiveness.

The international community agrees in consensus that SSDC is not to replace traditional North-South ODA. It continues to be a crucial aspect of development cooperation since it addresses global challenges and the global public goods which include health, environmental and intellectual commons, and international trade and finance. Northern nations also have the ethical obligation to actively deal with the inequities in the Global South that came from the centuries of colonization, exploitation, and political and economic subjugation.

Development assistance through SSC promotes new knowledge and experiences based on development cooperation practice in recipient countries and it gives a chance for practitioners to improve or reform the current development architecture and paradigm. SSDC itself promotes the key idea to the international community that development cooperation can be done with a win-win strategy, moving away from the unequal relations of traditional donor-recipient structure. It can further advance the principles of democratic ownership through international

cooperation among Southern CSOs and other development actors. It also shows that the countries of the Global South are active players in their development and contribute to the shared knowledge and solutions to global development challenges.

Developing countries and LDCs are also benefiting from the growing diversity of development actors and the regional formations that are being established. Global trade which was previously centered around the developed economies is undergoing flux due to the growth of South-South trade in the recent decades. Southern countries are exchanging vital development information and experiences that can be adapted to their particular social and economic realities. This also goes with technological transfer and capacity development that are now being implemented in partner LDCs or developing countries which are derived from successful practices in the Global South. Increasingly, many Southern countries are engaging in SSDC and see in it a more effective way of cooperating to achieve shared development goals.

Nevertheless, as the global economy shifts and the emerging economies develop, the BRICS and other emerging nations will play a bigger role in the evolving development architecture. The participation of these new providers is important in a context of the crucial gap in development financing and creating a more inclusive development architecture that takes into account the perspective of emerging nations. However, given the use of tied aid in Chinese and Indian development assistance and the issue of land-grabbing of foreign agrifood companies, there is a need to ensure that SSDC follow the principles of development effectiveness.

Ensuring adherence to these principles is a challenge since it works with a different framework and set of principles as ODA, and neither is it possible to lump them into the same definition. Despite this, there are other means to guarantee the effectiveness and sustainability of SSDC activities. This could be done through setting up monitoring and evaluation systems, increasing accountability of governments and agencies, and strengthening international or regional platforms on SSC. These are being facilitated with the help of the UN, other multilateral development institutions, and through High Level Meetings on SSC such as that of Bogota in 2010. While the UN framework provides the valuable venue for dialogue and advancement it is also crucial to continue constructive engagement within the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation to foster application of development effectiveness principles and commitments.

Furthermore, the need to usher in a participative, sustainable, and human development-oriented approach to international development cooperation is not only called for in SSDC but for the entire development paradigm. SSC has the potential to set examples and pressure Northern donors to follow good practices and take into account the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. But SSDC, by itself, will not change the current development paradigm. It provides

an active platform for strengthening the voice of the Global South but it does not aim to work towards development in isolation. The international development community is responsible for working towards a more just, sustainable, and inclusive development and SSDC complements that goal.

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DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, in the traditional North-South mode, has been based mainly on industrialized nations of the Global North providing aid to developing countries of the Global South to help meet the latter's development goals. Donor-recipient relations have been characterized as unequal and paternalistic, and aid has been used as a foreign policy tool for geopolitical and economic interests of developed countries. Such characteristics of traditional North-South aid led to the Global South's search for alternative development approaches.

South-South cooperation emerged in the 1950s in the context of the common struggle of former colonies for genuine independence and development. In the past few decades, there has been a notable rise of cooperation among Southern countries. They engage among themselves in active diplomatic dialogue, forums and knowledge-sharing hubs, regional or global economic or political formations, and development cooperation. These activities among the Global South are collectively referred to as South-South Cooperation (SSC).

SSC presents an opportunity for the Global South to create alternative spaces to pursue their development path. There is a need to thoroughly study and review the global experiences of countries engaged in SSC for them to wield it as a more effective development tool.

This IBON primer serves as an overview and initial exploration into the complexity of SSC, its particularities as a mode of development cooperation, the opportunities it brings, and the challenges that it faces.