The Unfinished Agenda of International Development Cooperation

The following will be the second part of a forthcoming IBON International paper titled "Towards a UN Convention on International Development Cooperation." The first section was released prior as "Decolonising Development Cooperation: Towards a reframing."

The global development landscape continues to be shaped by historical injustices and persistent structural imbalances that disadvantage the Global South. Despite decades of development cooperation, progress remains uneven, and many of the challenges faced by developing countries are deeply rooted in colonial legacies and ongoing economic exploitation. At the same time, developed countries have consistently failed to meet their commitments to official development assistance (ODA), both in quantitative terms (e.g., the 0.7% Gross National Income target) and in qualitative terms (e.g., adherence to development effectiveness principles). Given these persistent failures, there is a pressing need for a legally binding United Nations Convention on International Development Cooperation. Such a convention could strengthen accountability, address structural imbalances, and create a more just and effective global development framework.

Growing Development Challenges in the Global South

While there has been significant progress throughout the world in terms of eliminating extreme poverty, increasing life expectancy, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, extending literacy and basic education to more people, and other dimensions of human development, the outstanding development challenges remain enormous, especially in the Global South.

The 2024 Sustainable Development Goals Report highlighted that nearly half the 17 SDG targets are showing minimal or moderate progress, while over a one-third are stalled or going in reverse. For instance, while extreme poverty had been declining in the period up to 2019, the COVID pandemic set this back by three years (UN DESA, 2024, p. 8).

Looking at a more expansive indicator of human deprivation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that 1.1 billion people in 112 countries or 18.3 percent of the world's population are in "acute multidimensional poverty", over half of whom are children under the age of 18. Notably, multidimensional poverty is not confined to low-income countries. In fact, nearly two-thirds or 65.2% of all poor people live in middle-income countries compared to 34.8 percent in low-income countries (UNDP, 2024, p. 1).

Over half (637 million) of the 1.1 billion poor people live in households where at least one member does not have adequate nutrition, nearly half (513 million) are deprived of access to improved sources of drinking water, 828 million lack adequate sanitation, 886 million lack housing and over half (579 million) of all poor people lack electricity. And despite higher literacy rates globally, 590 million poor people live in a household where no member has completed six years of schooling while 482 million belong to households where one or more children are out of school (UNDP, 2024, p. 8).

Furthermore, only 31 per cent of the working-age population are legally covered by a comprehensive social security system. That means more than 4 billion people lack any social protection in a world marked by increased precarity of livelihoods due to climate change and changes in the world of work. On average, 85 per cent of the population in high-income countries is covered by at least one social protection benefit, while in low-income countries, the corresponding figure is only 13 per cent. (United Nations, 2024, p. 5).

All these development challenges are expected to worsen and be compounded in the foreseeable future due to mutually reinforcing impacts of the climate emergency, armed conflicts, debt and the dismantling of social institutions by right-wing governments and oligarchies.

Widening financing gap

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly emphasised the urgency of boosting international cooperation so that the SDGs are not left behind. Mobilising financial resources is a crucial part of this international cooperation.

The UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs (UN DESA) estimates that the annual SDG investment gap in developing countries amounts to about USD 4 trillion, with over half, or USD 2.2 trillion, needed for the energy transition alone. The most recent estimate of this investment gap for 2023 is 60 per cent higher than the USD 2.5 trillion estimated in 2019 due to financing shortfalls in previous years, compounded by more recent global challenges, including the pandemic, the food, fuel, and debt crises (UN DESA, 2024, p. 42).

Oxfam calculates that low- and middle-income countries need an additional USD 8.5 trillion in financing for the attainment of their SDGs in health, education, and social protection over the period 2023-2030. This translates to an annual financing gap of USD 2.8 trillion for these social sectors alone. This excludes the estimated financing gap of USD 13.7 trillion for climate change mitigation, USD 2.8 trillion for loss and damage and USD 2.4 trillion for climate adaptation for the whole seven year-period up to 2030 (Seery & Didier Jacobs, 2023, p. 2).

If the necessary actions already identified are not backed up by adequate financing posthaste, the social and environmental costs of inaction will continue to mount and the financing gap in the future is also likely to grow exponentially. For instance, one estimate of economic losses due to climate change puts it at USD 2.4 trillion by 2030 resulting from a reduction in total working hours under a business-as-usual warming scenario compared to a 1.5-degree warming scenario. This excludes the cost of damages caused by extreme weather events as well as the hundreds of thousands of lives lost from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea, heat stress and other climate-related causes (OECD, 2025, p. 31).

Apart from the cost of inaction on climate change, the UNESCO estimates that the annual global cost of inaction on education is USD 10 trillion in terms of reduced productivity and economic growth (quoted in OECD, 2025, p. 31), not to mention the potential human capabilities foregone.

While one side of this widening financing gap is widely acknowledged, namely the rising costs of dealing with the social and ecological impacts of the polycrisis, the other side is often ignored or even denied by Global North governments, namely the unjust international order that constrain the fiscal and policy space of Global South countries. International tax, financial, legal, trade and tech rules continue to facilitate the extraction of resources from the Global South that could be used instead to finance essential public services. While ODA would not be enough to remedy this situation, ramping up and reorienting ODA and IDC more generally can be part of the solution.

Persistent ODA shortfall

While the development challenges and the corresponding demand for IDC continues to increase, ODA levels remain far below what is needed. For instance, ODA from DAC donor countries rose to an all-time high of USD 223 billion in 2023. But only one-third of this total is considered country programmable aid (CPA)[1] which approximates the magnitude of ODA that actually flows to recipient countries. On the other hand, USD 31 billion or 14.4% of reported ODA was spent by donors in-country for costs related to hosting refugees and another 11.8% went to humanitarian relief rather than development efforts in the global South (OECD, 2025, p. 123). Moreover, around one-fifth of all bilateral aid from DAC donors was tied aid which is a blatantly self-serving form of assistance as it requires recipient countries to procure from companies from the donor country (Derlich & Simonds, 2024).

ODA is also being reoriented to mobilise commercial financing towards supporting the SDGs, even though this blending of ODA with private finance has been shown to be more expensive than pure public financing. More problematically, blended finance also redirects investments away from low-income populations who need most support even as its development additionality remains

1 The OECD-DAC defines Country Programmable Aid (CPA) as official development assistance (ODA) that is subject to multi-year planning at the country or regional level. It is calculated by subtracting the following categories of aid from the total of gross bilateral ODA: debt relief, humanitarian aid, administrative costs not included elsewhere, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, refugees in donor country, core support to NGOs, equity investments and, other unallocated. As such, CPA is closer to capturing actual aid flows to countries than the concept of gross ODA.

questionable (Blended Finance Project, n.d.). This is part of a wider effort of the OECD-DAC to "modernise" ODA by stretching its definition beyond recognition (Eurodad, 2023).

Even though reported ODA figures are inflated by including tied aid, money that remains in donor countries, money spent on humanitarian aid and other concerns that are not primarily for economic development, plus the practice of double counting, the wealthy countries still consistently fail to live up to their commitment to earmark 0.7 per cent of their gross national income (GNI) to ODA. Wealthy countries made this commitment at the UN General Assembly as early as 1970 and reaffirmed this pledge as recent as 2015 as part of the SDGs. Yet only a handful of donor countries have ever delivered on this promise over the course of the past half a century.

If one computes the unpaid ODA of the G7 countries alone, as Oxfam has done, one can conclude that the G7 countries owe the poor in developing countries USD 4.49 trillion as of 2023 or more than half of the ODA they promised. Total "undisbursed ODA flows" owed by DAC donor countries to the Global South have now reached USD 7.2 trillion, according to the Civil Society FfD Mechanism. By paying their "unpaid ODA debt", developed countries could provide vital resources to finance poverty eradication and address inequalities in developing countries (CSO FfD Mechanism, 2024).

Instead, ODA trends are going the opposite direction. If humanitarian aid to Ukraine and other conflict areas is excluded, ODA earmarked for eradicating poverty in developing countries is expected to decline in the coming years. Even before Trump and Musk decided to shut down USAID, eight wealthy countries have already announced USD17.2 billion in cuts to their ODA budgets over the next five years, and three other donor countries are likely to follow. Even Sweden and Norway, among the few countries that have fulfilled their 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment in the past, announced their intentions to slash their ODA moving forward. Moreover, a bigger share of the shrinking ODA pie is likely to be diverted by donors towards deterring migration and refugees entering their countries, or used as currency in “transactional diplomacy” to win over allies and undermine foes (Gulrajani & Pudussery, 2025).

Indeed, while claiming fiscal constraints, donor countries are “more generous” to particular recipient countries based on geopolitical considerations rather than the development needs in the global South (Reality of Aid, 2023). For instance, Ukraine, as a war-torn country at Europe’s doorstep, was the single largest recipient of aid in 2022 and 2023, absorbing close to 9% of total ODA since 2022 compared to just 14.8 per cent going to 45 least developed countries (LDCs) (Derlich and Simonds, p. 6).

The Global Governance of Development Cooperation

The persistent development challenges of the Global South, coupled with the failure of developed countries to meet their commitments, highlight the inadequacy of the current global governance of international development cooperation. The history of global norms for development cooperation reveals a complex and often contradictory landscape. While frameworks such as OECD-DAC's effectiveness agenda, UN-DCF and FfD processes, the UNOSSC's South-South Cooperation initiatives, and the GPEDC have all contributed to shaping global development cooperation, they have largely failed to address the structural inequities that define the global order.

The OECD-DAC

In 1960, ten donor countries and the Commission of the European Economic Community formed the Development Assistance Group (DAG) as a forum for consultations on assistance to developing countries. A year after, the

DAG was renamed the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and became part of the newly formed OECD. In 1969, the DAC adopted the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to refer to official financing provided on concessional terms with the primary aim of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries (OECD, 2021). Since then, the DAC has functioned as the principal institution for the global governance of ODA.

The DAC performs this role in three ways. First, it monitors ODA flows and remains the only official source of comparable and complete statistics on ODA. Second, it facilitates international policy dialogue among members and produces guidelines that set benchmarks and standards for various aspects of development cooperation such as the untying of aid, local cost financing, donor coordination, procurement practices, gender and development, environmental assessment of aid, and so on. Third, the DAC conducts regular peer reviews to assess the development cooperation practices of members and hold them to account against their commitments and international standards (DAC website).

Over the years, DAC's membership has grown to 33 member states including the largest providers of ODA. Eight non-OECD countries that are major providers of development cooperation also participate in the meetings of the DAC and its subsidiary bodies along with eight international organisations. The latter include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Development Programme and regional development banks (OECD website).

Despite this, the DAC has always suffered a legitimacy deficit for being an exclusive (mostly Western) donors' club overseeing an aid system that serves donor interests as much if not more so than developing country interests. For instance, in 2023, 22% of the total ODA reported by DAC members was spent domestically (Teutem & Ritchie, 2025). Moreover, despite enjoining donors to untie foreign aid since 1974, close to 16% of bilateral ODA is still tied or partially tied in 2022 (OECD Data Explorer).

Even the allocation of "untied aid" is heavily influenced by donor countries' self-interest. In their comprehensive review of the vast literature on aid effectiveness, Dreher, et al (2024) conclude that "the allocation of aid across countries suggests that donors take the economic need of recipients into account, but it plays a minor role." (p. 3). On the other hand, "there is solid evidence that a broad range of donors allocate aid in line with their (assumed) commercial interests." (p. 5). They also "prefer to cooperate with governments that share their political ideology and use aid to help friendly regimes stay in power" but at the same time, "donor countries use natural disasters as opportunities to exert influence on strategic opponents through the allocation of humanitarian and civil society aid." (p. 6)

To enhance its legitimacy, the DAC launched its Outreach Strategy in 2005. It expanded the composition of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to 80 members including representatives from bilateral, multilateral and emerging donors, developing country governments, civil society organisations, international aid initiatives, and the public and private sectors. The Working Party spearheaded the Paris High Level Forum in 2005 attended by over 100 developed and developing countries. The Paris HLF endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which established a monitoring system to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments (OECD, 2021).

The DAC also expanded its membership since 2009 to add 11 "new aid providers" in its roster including Korea, Czechia, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania (DAC website). It has also established dialogue structures with major non-DAC donors such as China, some Arab states and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2016).

Yet the DAC has been unable to shake off questions about its legitimacy as the de facto global governance body for IDC, not just because of its donor-led composition and structure but also because ODA continues to be wielded as a tool by donors for their commercial and geopolitical interests.

South-South Cooperation

In contrast to the power imbalance intrinsic to North-South ODA, development cooperation between and among countries in the Global South are characterised by their practitioners as horizontal partnerships. The UN defines South-South Cooperation (SSC) as "a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organisations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions" (UN, SSC/19/3).

SSC can be traced back to the 1955 Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, where the newly independent countries declared their commitment to deepen the process of decolonisation and achieve greater social and economic development for their people. The Bandung Communique enunciated ten principles which have since served as the touchstone for global South countries' international relations. These include what many still consider the core normative principles of SSC:

- Respect for fundamental human rights
- Respect for national sovereignty
- Recognition of the equality of all races and all nations
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of another country
- Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation
- Respect for justice and international obligation

The Bandung Conference led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 and the Group of 77 (G77) in 1964. This united front of the third world led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 despite the opposition of developed countries (Gosovic, 2018). The NIEO contained proposals on trade, industrialisation, agricultural production, finance, transfer of technology and regulation of transnational corporations with a view to "correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, [and] make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and developing countries…" The NIEO declared that "international cooperation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries" while also advocating for closer economic cooperation among developing countries to build the collective self-reliance of the Global South (United Nations, 1974).

A Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries was established to promote technical cooperation among developing countries. Its mandate was reinforced when the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) in 1978. This Special Unit hosted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was renamed the UN Office for South-South Cooperation in 2012. It describes the BAPA as "a detailed blueprint for major changes in approaches to development assistance and for a dramatically heightened emphasis on national and collective self-reliance among developing countries as foundations for a new international economic order" (Special Unit for TCDC, 1994 [1978]).

It is worth emphasising, however, that the UN TCDC and BAPA essentially limited South-South cooperation to "technical cooperation". This effectively excluded many aspects of economic cooperation envisioned in the NIEO, not to mention political cooperation, due to the reservations of developed countries (Gosovic, 2018).

Indeed, SSC encompasses a wide spectrum of norms and modalities including trade, investments, technology transfers, technical cooperation, regional integration and other forms of exchange. Some countries such as China even combine economic cooperation with political, social, cultural, judicial, and military cooperation (Velasquez and David, 2024). This makes SSC notoriously difficult to measure, monitor and compare across countries and over time, even by the UNOSSC.

Nevertheless, there is remarkable continuity in the normative principles that SSC partners invoke. Echoing the Bandung Declaration, the website of the UN Office of SSC states, “The South-South cooperation agenda and South-South cooperation initiatives must be determined by the countries of the South, guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit.”

However, despite a rhetorical consensus behind these SSC principles, in reality Southern governments are selective in their application. While SSC partners are generally averse to imposing and accepting conditionalities related to governance or political institutions, it is not uncommon for SSC to be packaged with commercial strings attached such as the obligation to purchase products or approve investments from the country “providing” SSC. Southern governments also appear to promote SSC in line with their foreign policy objectives such as garnering support for their positions in international forums, averting diplomatic isolation on the regional or global stage, or boosting soft power projection more generally (Velasquez and David, 2024, p. 71). In any case, all these are justified based on the SSC principle of mutual benefit.

But civil society organisations have criticised numerous SSC projects and initiatives for their lack of transparency, disregard for human rights, lack of social and environmental safeguards, absence of meaningful participation of affected communities, and deficient accountability mechanisms. The absence of a robust and consistent reporting framework for SSC poses extra challenges for monitoring and evaluating its impacts (Reality of Aid, 2010). More fundamentally, CSOs and critical scholars have criticised the SSC practices of emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil for perpetuating the same donor-recipient hierarchies they criticise and for promoting the same hegemonic development agenda of the global North that benefits domestic and transnational elites at the expense of people and the planet.

The UN DCF

With the rapid growth of China and a handful of other middle-income countries since the 1990s alongside the slowdown of developed economies, SSC in all its diverse forms and modalities grew rapidly in terms of magnitude relative to ODA. This accentuated the legitimacy deficit of the DAC as the putative governance platform for international development cooperation. This prodded the G77 to call for reforms in the global aid architecture during the United Nations (UN) World Summit of 2005. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was thus mandated to convene a multi-stakeholder forum on international development cooperation which led to the establishment of the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) in 2007.

According to DCF's mandate, it is open to "all stakeholders, including the organisations of the United Nations, the international financial and trade institutions, the regional organisations, civil society and private sector representatives" (Article 4). Members of parliament, representatives of local governments and academics are also invited to take part in its work. As such, the DCF claims to be the only international space that welcomes equal participation from all actors to the development process (Verschaeve and Orbie, 2016, p. 577). Therefore, from its inception, the DCF was explicitly positioned as the more inclusive and democratic alternative to the donor-led DAC.

However, the DCF has not been able to translate this inclusivity into effective governance of IDC. First, major donors show little enthusiasm for attending its activities. Records show that the European Union, France, the US, the UK, and Sweden among other large donors are frequently absent during the biannual gatherings of the DCF or the preparatory meetings in between these high-level events (ibid., p. 578).

Second, the DCF has no fully fledged secretariat to support its mandate. Instead, it relies on an advisory group of experts and information sourced from other institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the DAC. This means the DCF has limited capacity to produce novel or innovative research that draws from its more diverse knowledge base to yield innovative analytical outputs for policy makers. Third, the DCF's format is not conducive to meaningful dialogue and consensus building. Its meetings follow a tight schedule but allows all participants to take the floor, leaving little room for discussion and deliberation. Fourth, it has no mechanisms for monitoring or enforcing compliance with whatever agreements are reached during DCF meetings (ibid.).

Because of all these factors, the DCF has acquired the reputation of being a mere talk shop with little consequence on IDC policy and practice. Despite being positioned as a much more inclusive forum and an alternative to the DAC, the DCF has not made a significant dent on reshaping global norms and standards in IDC.

The GPEDC

While participating in the DCF, albeit in a low-commitment mode, the traditional donors in the DAC continued their outreach strategy to enhance DAC's legitimacy as well as influence beyond DAC members. This culminated in the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 attended by over 3,000 delegates in Busan, Republic of Korea. After extended negotiations facilitated by 18 sherpas elected to represent a wide group of stakeholders, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation was endorsed by 161 countries and territories, and 56 international organisations.

This declaration established an agreed framework for development cooperation based on four principles of development effectiveness, namely, country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability. The following year, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was formally founded, replacing the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, with secretariat support provided by the OECD and the UNDP. The GPEDC proclaims itself the broadest multi-stakeholder formation on international development cooperation, “bringing together governments, bilateral and multilateral organisations, civil society, the private sector and representatives from parliaments and trade unions among others, who are committed to strengthening the effectiveness of their partnerships for development” (GPEDC, 2025).

The signal achievement of Busan was getting “new actors” on board, specifically the emerging economies that are increasingly important contributors to SSC such as China, India and Brazil. Prior to Busan, these middle-income countries had been wary of entering DAC’s aid effectiveness tent for many reasons (Li et al., 2018). First, as developing countries that are still struggling to overcome poverty at home, they refuse to be lumped together with donors because that would make them ineligible to receive ODA and other forms of development cooperation. Second, they fear that the traditional (DAC) donors might increasingly offload their historical responsibilities to financing development and global public goods onto the shoulders of emerging economies (Bracho, 2021).

Third, they are unwilling to be held accountable to the same standards as traditional DAC donors. For instance, middle income countries typically engage in SSC based on the principle of mutual benefit, but this is generally considered contrary to the Paris principles on Aid Effectiveness. Fourth, emerging economies have their own bilateral, regional or inter-regional SSC platforms such as the BRICS, the India-Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), and the Network of

Southern Think Tanks (NeST) where they have greater autonomy from Northern donors. Lastly, when it comes to global governance, they see the UN as a more legitimate forum, not the OECD-DAC or DAC-initiated and -led formations such as the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (Besharati, 2013).

Busan was different from Paris because emerging economies were able to participate in the drafting of the outcome document and secure a slot for South-South cooperators in the governing structure of the GPEDC (Bracho, 2021). More crucial, however, were two key provisions in the Busan agreement. First is the explicit recognition that South-South cooperators are developing countries and therefore "they remain eligible to benefit from development cooperation provided by others" (Article 14). Second is the assurance that they will not be held accountable to the same standards as Northern donors. This is expressed in Article 14 which states that their inclusion as new actors is "based on common goals, shared principles and differential commitments." Even more significant is Article 2 which states, "the principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners *on a voluntary basis*" (emphasis added). These provisions are analogous to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" codified in the UNFCCC which was strongly opposed by Northern governments (Bracho, 2021). This Busan compromise was the price to pay for getting middle-income countries to support the GPEDC.

This conditional support, however, was short-lived. In the post-Busan process of negotiating the monitoring framework, DAC donors reasserted their convening power, brushing aside dissenting positions from partner countries and civil society (Deremeyer, 2012). The Post-Busan Interim Group, tasked to develop the monitoring framework for the GPEDC, declared a consensus behind ten indicators that draws from the Paris Declaration monitoring framework, supplemented with additional indicators intended to capture the broader dimensions of the Busan Partnership agreement (OECD & UNDP, 2014)

However, emerging economies who were not party to the Paris Agreement saw many of these indicators as applicable to traditional donors but not to South-South cooperators. They were therefore opposed to being evaluated according to these criteria. And while emerging providers were not required to provide data on their development cooperation activities, the first monitoring round of the Busan agreement presented information on ODA-comparable activities of China, India and other middle-income countries derived from data provided by receiving countries. In effect, emerging countries providing development cooperation were monitored and subjected to practically the same scrutiny as those of the traditional donors, contrary to the Busan compromise which was the basis for their participation in the GPEDC. As a result, China and India decided not to participate in the First High Level Meeting of the GPEDC in Mexico City in 2014, substantially weakening the claims of “inclusivity” of this partnership (Bracho, 2021).

The failure of the GPEDC to live up to its promise cannot be attributed solely to the donors’ insistence on universal standards or emerging economies’ avoidance of responsibilities. Uneven development in the Global South has given rise to some upper middle-income countries emerging as important sources of development assistance for other countries. While these “emerging economies” still adhere to the narrative of South-South solidarity when it comes to IDC, there is growing diversity of needs and interests among countries of the Global South. There needs to be a space and a process for Southern providers of IDC, their partners, and civil society to articulate norms appropriate to this distinct category of IDC. By extension, this will necessarily reshape the norms and practice of IDC globally, not just SSC. Therefore, there is a need for a new platform for the global governance of IDC that is not dominated by traditional donors or path-dependent on the norms and standards already laid down by the DAC.

IBON
INTERNATIONAL

Bibliography

Blended Finance Project. (n.d.). A Critique of Blended Finance. The Blended Finance Project. Retrieved 28 April 2025, from https://blendedfinancecritique.ca/a-critique-of-blended-finance/

Bracho, G. (2021). Failing to Share the Burden: Traditional Donors, Southern Providers, and the Twilight of the GPEDC and the Post-War Aid System. In S. Chaturvedi, H. Janus, S. Klingebiel, X. Li, A. de M. e Souza, E. Sidiropoulos, & D. Wehrmann (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of development cooperation for achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested collaboration (1st ed. 2021., pp. 367–391). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57938-8

CSO FfD Mechanism. (2024, 8 May). International Development Cooperation. Civil Society Financing for Development Mechanism. https://csoforffd.org/work/idc/

Derlich, S., & Simonds, M. (2024). Is this what aid was meant to be?: A critical analysis of Official Development Assistance in 2023. European Network on Debt and Development. https://www.eurodad.org/oda_analysis_2023

Eurodad. (2023, 28 November). ODA is stretched thin beyond recognition and DAC's credibility is at stake. European Network on Debt and Development. https://www.eurodad.org/oda_is_stretched_thin_beyond_recognition_and_the_dac_s_credibility_is_at_stake

GPEDC. (2025). About the Partnership. Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/about-partnership

Gosovic, B. (2018). On the Eve of BAPA+40: South-South Cooperation Today's Geopolitical Context. Vestnik Rossiĭskogo Universiteta Druzhby Narodov. Serii︠a︡ Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheni︠a, 18(3), 459–478. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2018-18-3-459-478

Gulrajani, N., & Pudussery, J. (2025, 23 January). With the knives out on development spending, have we reached 'peak aid'? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jan/23/global-development-economics-donor-spending-refugee-oecd-world-bank-peak-aid

Li, X., Gu, J., Leistner, S., & Cabral, L. (2018). Perspectives on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. IDS Bulletin, 49(3), 145–IV. https://doi.org/10.19088/1968-2018.153

OECD. (2021). DAC@60 Years — The DAC, 60 Years, 60 Highlights. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

OECD. (2025). Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025: Towards a More Resilient and Inclusive Architecture. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. https://doi.org/10.1787/753d5368-en

OECD & UNDP (2014), Making Development Cooperation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en

Seery, E. & Didier Jacobs. (2023). False Economy: Financial wiz won't pay the bill for a fair and sustainable future. Oxfam International. https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/false-economy-financial-wizardry-wont-pay-bill-fair-and-sustainable-future

Special Unit for TCDC (1994 [1978]). The Buenos Aires Plan of Action. United Nations Development Program. https://unsouthsouth.org/bapa40/documents/buenos-aires-plan-of-action/

Teutem, S. van, & Ritchie, H. (2025). How much foreign aid is spent domestically rather than overseas? Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/foreign-aid-domestic-overseas

UN DESA. (2024). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2024. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2024/

UNDP. (2024). 2024 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). Poverty Amid Conflict. In Human Development Reports. United Nations Development Programme. https://hdr.undp.org/content/2024-global-multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi

United Nations. (1974). Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, A/RES/3201(S-VI). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218450?ln=en&v=pdf

United Nations. (2024). World Social Report 2024. Social Development in Times of Converging Crises: A Call for Global Action (World Social Report). United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. https://desapublications.un.org/publications/world-social-report-2024-0

Verschaeve, J., & Orbie, J. (2016). The DAC is Dead, Long Live the DCF? A Comparative Analysis of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the UN Development Cooperation Forum. European Journal of Development Research, 28(4), 571–587. https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2015.27