In December 2015, 195 countries signed on to the Paris Agreement (PA) to commit to take action on one of the biggest challenges facing the world today, climate change. Five years of negotiations concluded in the 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with countries agreeing to keep global temperature increase well below 2 degrees Celsius, and if possible, below 1.5 degrees Celsius.

It has been almost two years since the PA was signed, but much work still lies ahead to get on with the challenging task of implementing the agreement in countries whose governments have joined in. There have also been recent developments that will affect international climate diplomacy and policy-making: i.e., the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, and the G19 leaders’ subsequent pronouncement to step up climate action.

With the 23rd Conference of Parties (COP 23) of the UNFCCC taking place in November, it would be important to understand and examine the issues at COP 23 and the long, bumpy road to implementing the Paris Climate Agreement.
stake in this annual gathering of world leaders. Are we any closer to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement? Will this measure up to people’s aspirations of climate justice and systemic change?

**Climate Diplomacy in Retrospect**

At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the UNFCCC was signed, setting the basis for international cooperation to ‘combat climate change’. The two other outcomes of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, i.e. UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification, are intrinsically linked to the UNFCCC in that these all called on governments to reframe their approaches to development on the basis of sustainability.

The UNFCCC emphasizes common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), a principle of international environmental law that says all states must take collective responsibility for the environment, but that their contributions will differ based on their varying levels of development. The UNFCCC recognizes that the largest share of past and current global greenhouse gas emissions are from developed countries. On the other hand, GHG emissions in most developing countries are growing as they try to meet their social and development needs. These countries too must reduce their emissions, but this will depend on financial resources and transfer of technology that developed countries are directed to support them with.

The Conference of the Parties (COP) was established as the highest body of the UNFCCC with the mandate to adopt the decisions necessary to promote its implementation. The first COP met in Berlin in 1995, and since then, COPs have taken place annually, with the 22nd COP hosted in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2016.

**The Kyoto Protocol**

The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is an agreement adopted at COP 3 in 1997 that committed internationally binding emissions reduction targets. Recognizing that developed countries are responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions from more than 150 years of industrial activity, the KP placed a heavier burden on developed nations in keeping with the CBDR principle. Its first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. The 192 Parties (191 states plus the European Union) to KP represent practically all UN member-states. Only four countries are not part of the KP: the United States (which signed but did not ratify the Protocol), Canada (which withdrew in 2011), Andorra and South Sudan.

Under the KP, Parties were categorized into three main groupings:

- Annex I countries – these were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1992, plus countries with so-called ‘economies in transition’ (EIT) such as...
Russia and other former Soviet-bloc countries. Annex 1 countries were required to reduce their GHG emissions to levels specified for each of them, and to submit an annual GHG inventory.

- Annex II – are the OECD members less the EIT countries. They are required to provide finance to help developing countries undertake mitigation and adaptation programs and provide technology to developing and EIT countries.

- Non-Annex I countries - pertain to the 155 developing countries, including China and India, who have no such binding obligations as Annex I countries, because they were not the main GHG emitters prior to the KP. But they, too, are committed to share the common responsibility of all countries to monitor, reduce and report their GHG emissions.

The KP aimed to reduce overall GHG emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012, deemed by many as too inadequate, based on scientific findings that point to the need for much deeper and drastic cuts. The KP targets were agreed on in 1997 and had a baseline of 1990 when it came into force in 2005. But global emissions have soared by nearly 40% from 1990 to 2009, according to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (The Guardian, 2011).

And while countries are expected to meet their commitments primarily through domestic actions, the KP introduced three market-based mechanisms: (a) International Emissions Trading, (b) Joint Implementation Mechanism, and (c) Clean Development Mechanism, which allowed for KP commitments to be monetized and traded as commodities in the global market. In essence, these allowed a convenient escape hatch for Annex I countries and their corporations from actually significantly altering their dirty production systems.

Commitments under the KP applied to emissions for the years 2008 to 2012, after which it was to expire. At the Doha COP 18 in 2012 member-states agreed to extend the life of the KP through the Doha Amendment, which defined a so-called second commitment period that would run from 2013-2020.5

The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol defines additional emissions reduction commitments for Annex I Parties, ranging between 0.5% and 24% compared to the base year (1990 in most cases). As of August 2017, only 80 Parties had ratified the Doha Amendment.6 It is therefore not yet effective, since a total of 144 signatories are needed for the amendment to enter into force.

Wanted: new international climate agreement

At the COP 13 in Indonesia, Parties decided to launch a process with the aim of reaching an agreement two years later. At COP 16 in Mexico in 2010, it recognized that deep cuts in global GHG emissions were required to limit the increase in the global average temperature below 2 degrees
Celsius (C) above pre-industrial levels. At COP 17 in Durban in 2011, the ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’ (ADP) was established to (a) develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention, applicable to all Parties, to be completed and adopted by the COP in 2015 and to be implemented from 2020 onwards, and (b) to enhance mitigation ambition before 2020.7

The climate change conference in Warsaw (COP 19) in November 2013 saw Parties agreeing on a loose timeline for proposing their ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs) to the new climate deal. INDCs reflect each country’s contribution to address climate change in their own countries, taking into account its domestic circumstances and capabilities. Some countries also reflected their plans in adapting to the impacts of climate change, and what support they need from or will provide to other countries. Once the new agreement is finalized, these will become ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs).8

At the COP 20 in Lima, Peru, the draft negotiating text and the Parties’ INDCs were adopted. The INDC submissions, especially those from developed countries, showed these pledges were not enough, and would still bring the world closer to 3 degrees C temperature rise.

The Paris Agreement

The 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC concluded its meeting on December 12, 2015 with a new accord that details the international community’s response on climate change.

The Paris Agreement (PA) aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The PA also aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. To reach these ambitious goals, appropriate financial flows, a new technology and enhanced capacity building framework will be put in place to support developing countries and the most vulnerable countries. The Agreement also provides for enhanced transparency of action and support through a more robust transparency framework.9

A major critique of the Paris Agreement is that the sharp distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries has been diminished. Reducing GHG emissions is now seen as a collective responsibility, while recognizing that doing so is harder for the less developed countries.10 This deviation from the CBDR principle is a major victory for the United States, which has consistently campaigned for removing this distinction between developed and developing countries.

One of the PA’s more important features is that it does not enforce any binding
commitments or targets. Countries can choose their own targets by submitting ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs) that will be reviewed in a ‘Facilitative Dialogue’ in 2018. These contributions are to be updated regularly, with reviews every five years beginning in 2023. The INDCs can be understood as a national plan to tackle climate change proposed by each government. It is an ‘initial offer’ outlining the kind of effort a country is willing to commit in addressing the climate crisis. Governments’ INDCs are ‘building blocks’ for the Paris Agreement.11

The Paris Agreement puts pressure on countries to submit and implement ambitious NDCs. But countries are not penalized for submitting underwhelming plans or for failing to meet their stated goals and targets. An analysis12 of INDCs submitted before COP 21 revealed that even if these INDCs were fully implemented, the expected rate of climate change decreases from 3.3 to 3.9 degrees Celsius (that is if everyone continues current policies) to 2.4 to 2.7 degrees Celsius (that is if everyone fully implements their INDC plans). In other words, the current pledges would not allow for the achievement of the stated goal of the negotiations, i.e., limiting the global temperature increase to below 2 degrees Celsius. And countries can deviate from their pledges whenever doing so is in their ‘national circumstance’.

The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, 30 days after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting for at least an estimated 55% of the total GHG emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Those who have ratified the PA will now convene as the Conference of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA),

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**BOX 2. THE WARSAW MECHANISM ON LOSS AND DAMAGE**

Loss and damage is a highly critical issue. Both slow onset (e.g., sea level rise, droughts, etc.) and sudden events (e.g., cyclones, hurricanes, etc.) prove that adaptation is not enough to address the impacts of climate change. These require measures beyond adaptation, and are regarded in the international negotiations as ‘loss and damage from human induced climate change.’ These terms are often associated with obligations and compensation, which explains why the topic raises heated debates, and tends to widen the divide between developed and developing countries.

Small island developing states have been raising this issue since the beginning of the UNFCCC negotiations, even highlighting the potential disappearance of UN member states like Tuvalu and Kiribati from the face of the earth as they go under water, from sea level rise caused by climate change over the next decades.*

At the COP 19 in Warsaw in 2013, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM) was established. The Paris Agreement states that the WIM shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. However, it also specified that the provisions on loss and damage do not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation. This reflects the position of developed countries, which oppose the idea of establishing a link, which might entail claims for compensation, between GHG emissions and climate change induced loss and damage.

* [http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/10/20/loss-and-damage-a-guide-for-the-confused/]
while those that have not yet ratified it will sit as observers. The CMA oversees the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

**IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT?**

The Paris Agreement entered ‘early into force’ on November 4, 2016 when the threshold of 55 Parties that together make up for 55% of GHG emissions was reached. Of the 197 Parties to the Convention, 166 have already ratified as of September 2017.\(^3\)

After the euphoria on the adoption of the Paris Agreement has settled, the wheels of implementation have to be put into motion. Negotiations at the COP 22 in Marrakesh were focused on developing and adopting a ‘rulebook’, the user manual for implementing the PA. But as it turns out, approving the goals for global climate action was much easier than agreeing on how to make good on these.

The COP 22 did not lead to any definitive conclusion, and so discussions will continue on at COP 23 in November 2017 on the following controversial issues:

- **Paris Agreement rulebook** – The Paris Agreement set out the overarching goals and framework for international climate action, but left many details to be filled in later. The Paris rulebook should be able to clarify the guidelines for implementing the PA, including who should do what, by when, how and with what financial support.

- **Facilitative Dialogue** - countries agreed to create a facilitative dialogue in 2018 to measure progress toward the PA objective of keeping global temperature rise to ‘well below 2 degrees C.’ This will inform the possible revision or resubmission of NDCs in 2020, should the outcomes show that what countries have pledged will not contribute to the achievement of the temperature goal.

Several contentious issues surround the scope of this dialogue, particularly on whether this covers only mitigation actions or will include progress around support and adaptation, as well as debates on whether this covers pre-2020 actions or only NDCs that will start in 2020. As the Paris Agreement only takes effect in 2020, the years 2015-2019 are ‘gap years’ for climate action since the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that provides for a 2nd commitment period is yet to take effect.

There is also an expectation that the Facilitative Dialogue will be able to resolve so-called ‘orphan issues’ of the Paris Agreement, i.e.,
### BOX 3 WHAT OUTCOMES SHOULD COP 23 DELIVER?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paris Rulebook</strong></td>
<td>The Paris Rulebook will be finalized at COP 24, and so COP 23 should be able to provide clarity on the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. the Global Stocktake must be designed to address heads-on the issue of equity (justice) in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and take a decision that it covers not only current NDCs but also shape the future NDCs to be submitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Transparency Framework must be designed to include means of reporting and verification of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Actions: reporting on efforts and progress, and not just what has been achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support: clarity on how to track what has been provided, especially on climate finance and technology transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilitative Dialogue</strong></td>
<td>The FD is regarded as the 1st round of the ambition mechanism in the Paris Agreement. It aims to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) measure progress in achieving the temperature goal, and (b) inform revision or resubmission of NDCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is important that the FD will also include discussions on assessing pre-2020 actions as there is nothing in place at the moment that compels Parties to undertake mitigation and adaptation actions (because the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol is not yet in force with only a few Parties signing on to it).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A meaningful FD outcome should be able to compel Parties to raise their NDC ambition and pledges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate Finance</strong></td>
<td>Given the deep divide among Parties on the sticky issues around the responsibility for providing climate finance especially for adaptation, it is expected that heated debates will continue on at COP 23. Advocacy needs to be stepped up such that this matter will be resolved, along with a decision on the Adaptation Fund and how it relates to other funding mechanisms under UNFCCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loss and Damage</strong></td>
<td>The 5-year work plan needs to be finalized and operationalized immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other issues</strong></td>
<td>Sessions need to be transparent and kept open to civil society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder Participation</td>
<td>Some member-states and civil society have raised the issue of ‘conflict of interest’ in the UNFCCC. Corporate lobbyists, particularly those coming from the fossil fuel industry, have found their way into the UNFCCC, to the extent of actually sitting in as negotiators. Parties and other stakeholders have been invited to submit position papers on this issue, which is to be decided on at COP 24.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Developing countries, while asserting that there is a ‘firewall’ between development aid (official development assistance or ODA) and climate finance, also want a clear roadmap on scaling up finance, which should be additional to ODA.

Tasks for which no one was assigned responsibility. These include important issues such as common timeframes for future climate pledges, and a new goal for climate finance.

- **Climate finance** – developing countries want the PA to ensure scaled-up and legally binding finance commitments by developed countries (and developing countries that have the capacity to do so), and to address gaps in the current financial architecture. Developing countries want enhanced climate finance premised on the full implementation of pre-2020 financial commitments and USD 100 billion as a starting point (and not the ‘ceiling’ or end-goal).

In addition to direct funding coming from the Parties and dedicated climate funds, private sector finance may also be mobilized. This is where it gets even blurrier between developed and developing countries as there is an ambiguity about which types of financing may be counted towards the USD 100 billion goal. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that a total of USD 62 billion in public and private finance were mobilized in 2014, up from USD 52 billion in 2013 and making an average of USD 57 billion annually over the 2013-14 period. Developing countries, while asserting that there is a ‘firewall’ between development aid (official development assistance or ODA) and climate finance, also want a clear roadmap on scaling up finance, which should be additional to ODA.

- **The future of the Adaptation Fund** – the AF was established under the Kyoto Protocol for climate adaptation and resilience activities. The AF is financed in part by government and private donors, and also from a two percent share of proceeds of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism projects. While countries agreed in Marrakesh that the fund should also ‘serve the Paris Agreement’, decisions on its governance and operations have proved contentious.

- **Loss and damage** – a five-year workplan was supposed to start in 2017 wherein countries were to start to formally address climate impacts that are beyond adaptation. These include topics such as slow-onset impacts of climate change, non-economic losses (e.g., culture and identity) and migration. However, this area of work is yet to really take off.

The task ahead at COP 23 is technically complex and politically charged, and is made even more challenging with recent developments that may affect the future of climate diplomacy.

The United Kingdom’s vote to exit from the European Union, also known as ‘Brexit’, has a wide range of implications for the European Union’s and the UK’s international relations and obligations, including those related to climate change. Some of these relate to INDC pledges, particularly on GHG emissions reduction, that the EU made when the UK was still part of the Union.

There is also uncertainty over the United States’ possible withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement as American President Donald Trump announced on June 1, 2017 his intent for the US to withdraw from the PA, stating that ‘the Paris accord will undermine (the US) economy, and ‘puts the (US) at a permanent disadvantage.’ This did not come as a surprise, as Trump, during the presidential campaign, had already pledged to withdraw from the PA, as this would help American businesses and workers. The US’ withdrawal is yet to be conveyed formally to the United Nations Secretary-General, but in line with UN rules, Parties may only withdraw 3 years after the PA entered into force. Hence, the earliest the US could give written notice of withdrawal is three years later, 4 Nov 2019, and the earliest the US could leave the Paris Agreement is 4 Nov 2020.

However, in a disturbing turn of events, the European Union has said that it is open to the United States ‘charting its own path’ (which is interpreted to mean that the US may water down its carbon-cutting pledges) within the Paris treaty. This is not received well by many developing country negotiators, who said that this is in violation of the spirit of the PA, which is to increase ambition and efforts at addressing climate change.

BEYOND COPS: THE URGENT CASE FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE

Climate change impacts are accelerating and causing immense losses and damages to lives and livelihoods. And if this were to be the yardstick by which the success of climate diplomacy is measured, it would show that negotiations alone are not enough to lead the way out of the climate crisis. To be effective and truly meaningful, climate policy and response would have to be appraised from the lens of science and justice.

The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report has highlighted that extreme events such as heat waves, extreme rains and coastal flooding will continue to increase as the global mean temperature rises. Many other studies corroborate that the frequency, intensity and duration of some extreme weather events have been changing as the climate system has warmed.

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### THE LONG-TERM CLIMATE RISK INDEX (CRI): THE 10 COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED FROM 1996 TO 2015 (ANNUAL AVERAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRI</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CRI Score</th>
<th>Total losses in million USD</th>
<th>Number of events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>568.04</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>1300.74</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>18.17</td>
<td>221.92</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>19.17</td>
<td>234.79</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>21.33</td>
<td>2761.53</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>2283.38</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>30.50</td>
<td>3823.17</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>31.33</td>
<td>2119.37</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>401.54</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>34.83</td>
<td>7574.62</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Germanwatch, 2017
The five warmest summers in Europe since 1500 have all occurred since 2002.\textsuperscript{19} For 2017 alone, one of the worst droughts in decades has devastated Southern Europe and East Africa, while Mongolia has registered its hottest temperatures in 56 years. Temperatures in Kuwait and Iraq have reached 54 degrees Celsius, and Baghdad has experienced temperatures of 43\textdegree C and higher nearly every day for the last two months.

Both the Arctic and Antarctic are also experiencing melting at an alarming rate, and concerns have been raised again when a trillion ton iceberg broke off the Larsen C, the fourth largest ice shelf in Antarctica with an area of about 44,200 km.\textsuperscript{20}

Monsoonal storms and floods have killed over a thousand people in India, Nepal and Bangladesh, forcing millions from their communities. Over the past months, torrential rains ravaged countless homes from Yemen, to Mexico, to Nigeria. Irma, the most powerful known hurricane in the history of Atlantic, has devastated the Northeastern Caribbean.\textsuperscript{21}

Scientific evidence points to the increasing dangers especially for poor people from developing countries due to global warming. Honduras, Myanmar and Haiti are the countries most affected by increased climatic risks in the last two decades, followed by Nicaragua, the Philippines and Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{22} (See Table on page 9)

Vulnerability to climate change impacts is determined not just by geography, but also by socio-economic conditions. According to the World Risk Index: “the risk of a natural event turning into a disaster always depends only partly on the force of the natural event itself. The living conditions of the people in the regions affected and the options available to respond quickly and to provide assistance are just as significant.”\textsuperscript{23}

Climate change is a global problem affecting everyone, but it hits the poor in poorer countries more severely as this is compounded by persistent problems of poverty, landlessness, unemployment, inadequacy of social services, corrupt institutions, and others.

There is growing evidence that social conflicts and war are far more likely to happen as the ensuing impacts of climate change (e.g., food, water and energy) become more pronounced. Although climate change in itself does not drive conflict, the way it interacts with other economic, political and cultural processes is generating increased social tension. For every half-degree of warming, societies will see between a 10 and 20 percent increase in the likelihood of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{24} During the 2015 US presidential campaign, Bernie Sanders warned that countries around the world are “going to be struggling over limited amounts of water, limited amounts of land to grow their crops and you’re going to see all kinds of international conflict.”\textsuperscript{25} In that context, many states have increasingly resorted to a militarist response, i.e., more repression to quell social unrest, secure borders, protect supply-routes and markets for corporations, etc.

A stark case example is the Syrian conflict, which has claimed the lives of over 150,000 people. Between 2006 and 2011, the
country suffered the worst long-term drought and the most severe set of crop failures in recorded history. This was compounded by water mismanagement and economic deterioration that, in turn, led to further agricultural failures, population dislocations and the migration of rural communities to nearby cities. The resulting combination of urban unemployment, inequality and food insecurity, affecting over a million people, heightened sectarian tensions, and helped spark the social unrest that exploded into conflict.26

Super-typhoons, forest fires, droughts, landslides, and other catastrophes are already bearing down on communities the world over. The Norwegian Refugee Council reports that in 2015 only, more than 19.2 million people fled disasters in 113 countries. This is equivalent to ‘one person, every second, who is displaced by disaster.’ Even the International Organization for Migration (IOM) forecasts 200 million climate-induced displacement by 2050, moving either within their countries or across borders, on a permanent or temporary basis.27

Climate change is, without a doubt, political. It is about understanding that the extractivist model of economic growth is aggravating the climate crisis. It cannot be dissociated from the issues of trade, finance, investments, as well as how militarism and wars facilitate and lead to more resource extraction that generates huge profits to corporations and the elites while displacing communities and does further harm to the environment. Climate change is ultimately a justice issue that must address the historical and current imbalances and inequities between countries and within societies.

Understanding these interlinkages make it easier to understand why governments are forever locked into endless debates in the international negotiations, and why they are not responding reasonably to the urgency of science, and much less to the imperatives of justice. And this is why focusing on the COP alone is not enough.

It remains a top imperative for the people of all countries, through their movements and organizations, to assert their urgent and long-term demands for climate justice. There is a need to actively and meaningfully participate – raising questions and critiques to help shape real long-term solutions to the climate crisis. Genuine, long-lasting solutions to climate change are attained by asserting the sovereignty of people as the foundation for the profound transformation of the dominant systems and structures.

ENDNOTES

1. Only Nicaragua and Syria did not sign on to the Paris Agreement.


3. The Group of Twenty (G20) is the self-designated ‘premier forum for international economic cooperation’ from 20 major economies: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union. https://qz.com/1024503/g19-vs-the-usa-other-leaders-form-unified-front-while-trump-splits-with-g20-on-climate/


IBON International engages in capacity development for people’s rights and democracy around the world.

3rd Floor IBON Center
114 Timog Avenue,
Quezon City
1103 Philippines
Tel: +632 9277060 to 61
local 203 & 207
Fax: +632 9276981

Email
editors@iboninternational.org

Web
iboninternational.org

20. https://worldat1c.org/hot-scary-summer-d1eb31867407